Right Steps & Poui Trees


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INDECOM Reports 8 Police Fatal Shootings in the Past Week: Any Body-Worn Camera Footage?

INDECOM logo 2In two press releases this week, the Independent Commission of Investigation (INDECOM) reported on eight people having been killed in the past seven days by members of the Jamaica Constabulary Force (JCF). In one of those incidents, members of the Jamaica Defence Force (JDF) were also involved.

The first release was issued on Monday:INDECOM Nov 6 2017 release aINDECOM Nov 6 2017 release b

The second release was issued today:INDECOM Nov 9 2017 release

The incidents took place in 5 different parishes: Kingston, St Catherine, Clarendon, St Mary and St James. As it investigates the incidents, INDECOM is asking anyone who may have witnessed or may have information about any of the fatal shootings to contact the organization.

One question I would ask is if any of the police involved in any of the fatal shooting incidents was wearing a body-worn camera and if there is any footage of the incidents. This would be particularly relevant to the incident in Salt Spring in St James, as that is reported as having ocurred during a planned police operation carried out by Mobile Reserve.

Terrence WilliamsAt a press conference on September 27, 2017, INDECOM Commissioner Terrence Williams spoke to the potential usefulness of body-worn cameras, saying:

“…most of the police shootings that you have in Jamaica have no witnesses but the police. So most of them will have no resolution but the police version, which may be true or it may be false. The body-worn camera provides that…an assistance in that accountability. And we were arguing from day one that why not use the body-worn cameras on those planned operations. So that you know you are going into a confrontation-type situation, it’s a very good time to wear the camera. So that your version of events can be depicted in this way of real evidence. We’re not seeing that at all. And we’ve had no update on it.”

He also made the startling statement:

“…in none of the shooting events that we have under investigation, including planned operations, were any body-worn cameras worn by the officers involved.”

COP QualloI think Commissioner of Police George Quallo needs to say whether the announced JCF body-worn camera programme is in operation or has been abandoned outside of the Zones of Special Operations.

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$75 Million Allocated To Retrofit Police Lock-Ups For Children: So What Happened?

Parliament - gordon-house-2In 2013, the Jamaican Parliament was told that $75 million was to be spent retrofitting five police lock-ups with “child friendly” areas for the detention of children. In 2017, a Parliamentary Committee has now been told that the retrofitting of four lock-ups was completed in 2015 and that the areas were handed over to the Jamaica Constabulary Force (JCF). The Committee was also told, however, that the retrofitting was so poorly done that the “child friendly” lock-ups have never been used and that it will take an additional $32 million for recommended repairs to be done, $17 million of which has already been allocated in the 2017 – 18 budget.

At its last two meetings, Parliament’s Internal and External Affairs Committee has discussed this much-touted government programme for retrofitting police lock-ups with “child friendly” areas. The information shared in those meetings raises serious questions about the implementation of the programme and the money spent on what some, myself included, thought to be an ill-conceived idea when it was originally proposed.

On September 19, 2017, the Committee  had a meeting, which Opposition MP Peter Bunting chaired, and discussed a Ministry of National Security (MNS) report titled Status of Retrofitted Children’s Detention Facilities Island Wide – June 30 2017. Committee members expressed dissatisfaction with the report and raised concerns about some of its contents. They decided to ask MNS representatives to attend the Committee’s next meeting to provide further information and to answer questions that had arisen.

Fitz Jackson MP

MP Fitz Jackson

 

On Tuesday, October 10, 2017, the Committee met again, this time with Opposition MP Fitz Jackson as Chair; having recently been appointed Opposition Shadow Minister of National Security, he has taken over from MP Bunting as Committee Chairman. The delegation from the MNS and the Jamaica Constabulary Force (JFC) that appeared before the Committee was led by Mrs Mitsy Beaumont-Daley, Acting Chief Technical Director at the MNS, and Commissioner of Police George Quallo. The MNS submitted an updated report titled Report – Physical Condition of Retrofitted Children’s Detention Facilities Islandwide – October 5 2017 to the Committee. This was accompanied by a report of inspections made of the four relevant police lock-ups on September 26 & 27, 2017 and a collection of photographs showing the physical condition of the facilities.

Background to Decision to Retrofit Lock-Ups

The October 5, 2017 MNS report gives the background to the decision to retrofit these four police lock-ups:

“An Inter-Ministerial Working Group was established in September 2012 by the then Ministry of Youth and Culture. The primary purpose of the Working Group was to examine the issues and challenges that affect children within the care of the State.

A significant focus of the Committee was to provide a solution for the separation of juveniles who come in conflict with the law from adults in police lock-ups. In this regard a programme was developed to establish self-contained child friendly holding units to accommodate such children. Thirteen (13) units were to be established in strategic locations across the fourteen parishes with Kingston and St. Andrew operating as one facility. The Jamaica Emergency Employment Programme (JEEP) was identified as the source of funding and the facilities were constructed by the National Works Agency (NWA).

The plan was to retrofit/construct the units in phases. Four (4) were to be completed in the first phase namely Bridgeport in St. Catherine, Barrett Town in St. James, Moneague in St. Ann and Nain in St. Elizabeth. By 2015 all facilities were handed over to the Jamaica Constabulary Force, except for Nain.” p. 1

Indeed, then Minister of Youth and Culture Lisa Hanna reported on the retrofitting programme in her Sectoral Debate presentation in 2013:Hanna Sectoral presentation 2013 28Hanna Sectoral presentation 2013 29

And again in 2014:

Hanna Sectoral presentation 2014 p12Hanna Sectoral presentation 2014 p13

The October 5, 2017 MNS report points out that the programme completely failed to deliver what had been promised:

“Following the handing over of the facilities, a walk through was conducted which revealed that the buildings were not as safe and secure as they appeared. Several defects were observed that were described as “potential” safety hazards as well as unfinished works.

Discussions were held with the contractors (NWA and JEEP) who gave assurance that the matters would be addressed in short order. However, as at September 27, 2017, only one station (Bridgeport) toilet facility was reconfigured, the others have not been addressed and the newly constructed structures were left to deteriorate.”

One has to ask, as did some of the members of the Committee, what level of consultation took place regarding the design of these facilities? What monitoring took place while the work was being done? And what accountability has there been regarding the poor quality of the completed work, at and since the point of handover?

Identified Problems at Retrofitted Lock-Ups

The MNS October 2017 report outlines the problems that they identified with the rerofitted facilities:MNS lock-up retrofitting report Oct 2017 - flaws aMNS lock-up retrofitting report Oct 2017 - flaws b

Looking at just one of the issues of concern, items (iii) and (iv) deal with the basic and important issue of proper ventilation. In the MNS June 30, 2017 report, three of the four facilities are identified as having a problem with ventilation and some very stark language is used to describe the problem.

Barrett Town: “9. The ventilation for the cells is very poor and could lead to suffocation.”

Moneague: “5. The ventilation for the cells is very poor and could lead to suffocation if the windy climate at Moneague should cease.”

Nain: “The facility is not suitable for habitation due to very poor ventilation.”

The September 2017 MNS inspection report uses less dramatic language in describing the ventilation problem and the associated recommendations, but the problem remains as a concern:MNS Oct 2017 - lock up inspection report aMNS Oct 2017 - lock up inspection report b

The provided photographs give a visual indication of the situation being described:MNS police lock ups photos - Oct 2017 report The MNS October 2017report speaks of the facilities being “constructed from a prototype plan”. What did this plan require regarding ventilation? Who was consulted in designing this plan? What standards were used as a guideline for developing this plan?

And if it is said that the prototype plan was adequate, is it that the work done varied from the plan? If so, wasn’t this noticed while the work was being done? And again, why has there been no accountability for the poor work done? Why is it that the facilities remained unused and deteriorating, after so much money was spent?

What Next?

At the end of the Committee meeting on October 10, MP Jackson said that the scope of the investigation into the use of public funds for this retrofitting went beyond the mandate of the Internal and External Affairs Committee. He said that the Committee would complete its report to Parliament on the matter and that further investigation would need to be done by the Public Administration and Appropriations Committee (PAAC) and/or the Public Accounts Committee (PAC).

This is a matter that demands explanation and accountability, at the stages of planning, implementation and sign off. With all that is needed for children who come into conflict with the law, with the often heard excuse of lack of resources, we owe it to them to demand that the Parliament does its part in achieving full accountability.

In this post, I have focussed on the expenditure and the facilities, but there remains the substantive problem of children being held in police lock-ups. The situation has changed somewhat in the past few years, but there is still a need for the government to present a more careful analysis of data to identify the causes of the problem and whether this is the best solution.

If $75 million has already been spent and an additional $32 million is to be spent, is the end result after spending $107 million really going to be the best solution for the children involved?

The Internal and External Affairs Committee of Parliament

Many of us may not be familiar with the mandate of Parliament’s Internal and External Affairs Committee and may wonder why this matter came before it. The Standing Orders of Parliament gives a description of the Committee’s role, which makes this clearer:Internal and External Committee

(From Standing Orders of the House of Representatives of Jamaica 1964 )

The current members of this Committee are:

Members of Parliament: Mr Fitz Jackson (Chair), Dr Lynvale Bloomfield, Mr Dave Brown, Mr Leslie Campbell, Mr Heroy Clarke, Mr Horace Dalley, Mr Colin Fagan, Mr Floyd Green, Mr Alando Terrelong and Mr Franklin Witter.

(As a member and representative of human rights organization Jamaicans for Justice, I worked on this issue when it first arose. I remain a member of the organization. My blog posts are all done in my personal capacity, however.)


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Body-Worn Cameras: A Secret Transparency Tool?

I remain concerned that to date the public has no idea what protocols govern the use of body-worn cameras  by police or soldiers in Jamaica, although these cameras are now being used by the police here. Body-worn cameras are widely regarded as a tool that may enhance accountability and transparency in policing, bringing an additional source of information about interactions between the police and the public. Inadequate protocols governing their use can, however, completely undermine any benefit to be derived from the wearing of such cameras. How can the Jamaican public know if the protocols governing use of body-worn cameras here are adequate, if we don’t know what those protocols are?

Zones of Special Operations (ZOSO) Act & Body-Worn Cameras

The recently passed Law Reform (Zones of Special Operations)(Special Security and Community Development Measures) Act, 2017 makes provision for the wearing of body-worn cameras by members of the Joint Forces – police and soldiers – within declared special zones.

Section 19(1) of the Act says:Zones of Special Operations Section 19 1

Section 19(2) of the Act requires the establishment of protocols and procedures for the use of the cameras, setting out some of the matters that may be dealt with in the protocols and procedures.Zones of Special Operations Act Section 19 2 AZones of Special Operations Act Section 19 2 B

 

Prime Minister Holness’ Commitment

Last week I was able to put a question about the current status of these required protocols to Prime Minister Andrew Holness, via a tweet to Cliff Hughes during his  Online programme on Nationwide News Network. The Prime Minister was the guest on the weekly Ask The OPM segment of Hughes’ programme and was fielding questions by phone & social media. I asked:SG tweet 19-9-17 Hughes PM body cameras

Hughes asked the questions and PM Holness answered:

“The protocols are established but we have a resource challenge. So the police do have body cameras. We have still…we have identified a supplier and we need to outfit the military with cameras and that is being done. As I said earlier, this is a proof of concept and much learning is taking place. So all the protocols that were established will…we will review them to see how they actually work on the ground, but by the time the second zone is around, we should have final protocols. We’ll share them with the public; there is nothing secret about the ZOSO and we should be able to outfit all key personnel… operational personnel with body cameras.” (Transcribed from recording, Cliff Hughes Online, Nationwide News Network, September 19, 2017)

I am glad for the Prime Minister’s commitments that protocols have been established, that they will be finalised before a second zone is declared and that they will be made public. He didn’t say, however, whether the protocols have been shared with INDECOM (the Independent Commission of Investigations) and, at this point, we have no clear timelines for the things committed.

 

Police and body-worn cameras prior to ZOSO

The wearing of body-worn cameras by members of the Jamaica Constabulary Force (JCF) didn’t begin with the passage of the ZOSO Act or the declaration of the first Zone. Body-worn cameras have been recommended and discussed for many years in various quarters, including the government, civil society, international bodies and the JCF itself. In recent years, steps were taken to start the process within the JCF.

In 2014, then Minister of National Security Peter Bunting announced that select police units would begin to wear body cameras and “noted that a protocol [would] be established, making it mandatory for the officers to engage the cameras once they [were] going on an operation.”

 

In August 2016,  there was an official launch of the body-worn camera project at the Office of the Commissioner of Police. Then Commissioner Carl Williams said: “This is a significant step on the road to improving our human rights record and ultimately, public trust. As we accept these body-worn cameras, I cannot help but underscore the remarkable stimulus that they provide for Police reform, and conformity by suspects. These devices will provide greater transparency, build public trust and provide evidence against false accusations.” Minister of National Security Robert Montague “stated that these cameras [would] aid in significantly improving the trust between members of the Force and the public.”

In February this year, the JCF announced that some police had actually started wearing the provided body cameras.

At this point, INDECOM indicated its concern “that the JCF [had] not yet advised INDECOM as to the proposed procedures and protocols that [would] govern the use of the equipment, collection and storage of data, and subsequent viewing of the footage.” (INDECOM Press Release 21-2-17) In a discussion on Nationwide News Network the following morning, Superintendent Stephanie Lindsay, head of the Constabulary Communications Unit, responded to INDECOM’s concerns saying that “We have a protocol that guides the operation of these cameras internally; it is not something that we would be discussing externally.” It is astounding that the JCF would consider it appropriate not to share the protocols governing the operation of body cameras with the independent oversight body mandated to investigate fatal shootings and allegations of abuse by the police. At the time of INDECOM’s May 26, 2017 press conference, they had still not seen the JCF’s protocols.

Given the approach of the JCF regarding INDECOM, it is hardly surprising that the JCF’s protocols haven’t been made public.

Protocols And Procedures

I have wondered whether the protocols and procedures governing the use of body-worn cameras within the declared special Zones would differ from those governing their use outside of the Zones. Indeed, I do not think that it is satisfactory that the drafting of such protocols should be left to the Heads of the Army and Police Force, with no requirement for consultation with any other body, INDECOM or the Office of the Public Defender, for example.

In a Twitter thread about body-worn cameras (yes, I do tweet a lot), I asked the following question and got a reply from Commissioner of Police Quallo:SG tweet 8-9-17 body camera protocols

COP Quallo tweet 10-9-17 body cameras protocols(*SOP = Standard Operation Procedure)

Finally, while the assurances of PM Holness are welcome, until the protocols are actually made public, they may be a comfort to a fool.

  • We do not know if the cameras already in use – since the declaration of the first Zone, since earlier this year (or before?) – have captured any footage relevant to any fatal shooting by the police or any alleged instance of abuse.
  • We do not know when cameras should be turned on or off and what sanctions there are for not complying with this.
  • We do not know if footage has been safely stored for the record or has been destroyed intentionally or inadvertently.
  • We do not know how long video is stored for or  who has access to such footage and under what circumstances? INDECOM? The police or soldiers involved in an incident? Lawyers – either for an accused person or the family of someone killed by the police or an involved policeman? Journalists? The public?
  • We know nothing about what has governed the use of the body-worn cameras to date and any video footage that has already been recorded.
  • Etc…

If the public doesn’t know what the protocols and procedures are, how can we know if they are adequate? And if we don’t know whether the protocols and procedures are adequate, how can the use of body cameras build trust?

Body-worn cameras can’t be a secret tool of transparency and accountability.

Related Post

350 Words or Less: Police Using Body Cameras, But What Protocol Is Regulating Their Use?

 

 

 


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JCF Administrative Review Committee Clears JCF…Of Pretty Much Everything

Two days ago (August 8, 2017) Commissioner of Police George Quallo released the “Report of Administrative Review Committee Appointed to Review Conduct of JCF Named Officers During the 2010 West Kingston Operation and Related Matters”.

 

(Click for JCF West Kingston Administrative Review Committee Report – June 2017)

Since the release, there has been increasing discussion of the report, with expressions of criticism and concern. I have been among those expressing concerns as, having read the report, I believe it raises questions of process, substance and tone. I think that beyond the report itself, there is also the consideration of its wider impact on issues of post-Commission of Enquiry processes and of police accountability.

The Committee started its review on February 28, 2017 and concluded on June 19, 2017, having had eleven sittings. Its Terms of Reference (TOR) were as follows:JCF Administrative Review Committee TORThe members of the Committee were:JCF Admin Review Comm members

The findings of the Committee were as follows:

TOR 1

1a) 3.11 The Committee, having reviewed the Operations Plan, agreed that the Command Structure was appropriate for the task.

1b) 4.8 Having reviewed the Operations Plan, reports and statements of the JCF officers vital to the Terms of Reference, the Committee agreed that the Command Protocol was adequate.

1c & 1d) 5.10 Upon a thorough review of the conduct of the operation, the Committee agreed unanimously, that the span of control was clear and the span of command effective.

1e) 6.18 Despite the absence of the CIB participation and the delays occasioned by the prevailing circumstances, the Committee agreed that effective and adequate investigations were carried out in instances where deadly force was used.

6.19 The Committee finds that there was a system to ensure effective and adequate
investigations in the event of the resort to use of force by members of the JCF.

6.20 The Committee finds that the system was not followed according to the plan. However, the BSI rose to the occasion.

TOR 2

7.63 Upon a complete and thorough examination of the evidence, including, the Operation Plan, various reports, transcripts and statements; and for the reasons stated above, no basis could be found by the Committee, upon which any of the Named Officers should be cited for misconduct and/or dereliction of duty.

In the final account, the Committee found that the JCF, its systems, performance and members were “appropriate”, “adequate”, “clear”, “effective”, “effective”, “adequate”, “effective”, “adequate”, “rose to the occasion”, without basis to “be cited for misconduct and/or dereliction of duty”. The report and its findings give little indication of the kind of self-reflection that would be valuable to the police force following the events of 2010 and the report and recommendations of the Commission of Enquiry.  There is a sense of the-JCF-did-nothing-wrong-time-to-move-on.

As required by TOR 3, recommendations were given:JCF Admin Review Comm recommendations 1JCF Admin Review Comm recommendations 2

I have some questions about the process of the Administrative Review, including the following:

– In its June 30, 2016 press release responding to the Commission of Enquiry report, the JCF committed to establishing an Independent Administrative Review Panel which would be composed of  “one Deputy Commissioner of Police, the head of the Inspectorate of the Constabulary (IOC), one member of the Police Service Commission (PSC), one member of the Police Civilian Oversight Authority (PCOA), and one independent person, preferably an attorney at law, to be selected by the PSC and PCOA.” Why was the proposed composition for the Panel not eventually followed?

– What were the reasons that resulted in the review taking eight months to begin?

– The Committee made an initial decision not to require any of the 5 named officers to appear before it and even when one member of the Committee made a formal request for two of the officers to appear, the majority decision was not to require this. What was the reasoning behind not making use of the presence of the officers to give additional clarity during the review process?JCF Admin Review Comm methodology

There are points at which the Committee’s tone seems to be defensive and dismissive in a manner that is not appropriate or useful. One such instance of this is in a section entitled “Other Evidence”.JCF Admin Review Comm - other evidence

The assertion in 7.44 that the Commission didn’t seem to be concerned with the dangerous nature of the operation and the heavy gunfire faced by officers on the ground is hard to understand if one watched the proceedings of the Enquiry or if one has read the Commission’s report. Chapter 4, for example, is squarely focused on this matter, and its contents and findings contradict this assertion in the Administrative Review Report.WKGN COE report Ch 4 pic

The assertion in 7.44 also seems to be dismissive of the concern with collection of bodies shown by the Commission. Scores of people died during the May 2010 operation, 69 according to the Commission’s findings. This was one of the most grave outcomes of the operation. It was absolutely necessary that the Commission devote attention to uncovering information that could assist in establishing the circumstances in which these people died. The collection of bodies was not something detached from this process, as the time, location and manner of such collection could contribute valuable information.

AHHThe Office of the Public Defender has been involved from the start in the process of seeking the truth about what happened in the May 2010 operation. It is not surprising that the current Public Defender, Arlene Harrison Henry, has issued a statement about the just released JCF report. In the statement, she calls for the withdrawal of the Administrative Review Committee report and she has indicated that her Office has written to the Attorney General for an opinion on the way forward. (Click for Office of the Public Defender – Press Release re JCF Administrative Review 2017)

There is more to be said and I will deal in subsequent posts with additional aspects of the Review report and its implications.

 

Related Post

When Will The Public See The JCF Administrative Review Report, Commissioner Quallo?


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When Will The Public See The JCF Administrative Review Report, Commissioner Quallo?

Last Friday, July 28, 2017, the High Command of the Jamaica Constabulary Force (JCF) released the following statement indicating that it has completed an Administrative Review into the May 2010 operation in Western Kingston.JCF release re admin reviews - 28-7-17 aJCF release re admin reviews - 28-7-17 b

Jul.28l.17 – High Command responds to Editorial

The release referred to a Gleaner editorial (actually published on July 24, 2017), which questioned the lack of a public update regarding the JCF’s promised actions in response to the recommendations of the Western Kingston Commission of Enquiry.

The Commission’s report was tabled in Parliament on June 15, 2016, and two weeks later, on June 30, 2016, the JCF issued a press release giving its response to the recommendations made in the Commission’s report. It indicated its position regarding a number of the recommendations –  15.17, 15.18, 15.20, 15.21, 15.22, 15.27, 15.28, 15.30, 15.31 – 15.33, 15.34, 15.35 – saying what actions it intended to take in response.  I do wonder why it took 8 months more (according to last Friday’s press release) for the promised review to begin.

I hope that Commissioner Quallo will make the report public sooner rather than later; it is reportedly now being “shared with the various oversight bodies for the JCF.” Until then, the public will not be able to assess the scope and adequacy of the review or its recommendations. This public accounting is an essential part of the post-Enquiry process.

Twitter Thread

Below is a series of tweets that I made on June 30, 2017, highlighting some issues that ought to be dealt with in the JCF review report.

SG tweet 30-6-17 1SG tweet 30-6-17 2SG tweet 30-6-17 3SG tweet 30-6-17 4SG tweet 30-6-17 5SG tweet 30-6-17 6SG tweet 30-6-17 7SG tweet 30-6-17 8SG tweet 30-6-17 9SG tweet 30-6-17 10SG tweet 30-6-17 11SG tweet 30-6-17 12SG tweet 30-6-17 13SG tweet 30-6-17 14SG tweet 30-6-17 15SG tweet 30-6-17 16SG tweet 30-6-17 17

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