Right Steps & Poui Trees


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350 Words Or Less: What Was The JDF Response To The Commission Of Enquiry Recommendations?

Quite rightly, there are increasing questions about the Jamaica Defence Force (JDF) response to the recommendations made by the West Kingston Commission of Enquiry, which examined the 2010 security operation, in which 69 or more people were killed. This comes in the wake of the release of the Jamaica Constabulary Force (JCF) Administrative Review Report, which has been met with much criticism and calls for its withdrawal.

I hadn’t been able to find online the JDF’s press release sent out in June 2016 after the Commission of Enquiry report was made public. So, two weeks ago I called the JDF and asked for a copy. Within less than half an hour, I received an email with the press release attached.JDF press release re WKGNCOE

The JDF’s release is much shorter and less specific than the similar release by the JCF at the time.

The list of recommendations in Chapter 15 of the Commission’s report included a number of recommendations regarding the JDF. An official public update on the status of the implementation of those recommendations would be in order. Will the JDF give such an update? Will the Government require that the JDF gives such an update? These questions highlight, once again, the need for a post-Enquiry requirement for a structured timetable of official, public updates regarding the implementation of recommendations. These matters are too important to be left to speculation or ad hoc reporting.

WKGN COE rec 15.17WKGN COE rec 15.20WKGN COE rec 15.22WKGN COE rec 15.23WKGN COE rec 15.24 - 26WKGN COE rec 15.28WKGN COE rec 15.31 - 33WKGN COE rec 15.34WKGN COE rec 15.36

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JCF Administrative Review Committee Clears JCF…Of Pretty Much Everything

Nearly A Year Later: Time for Western Kingston Commission of Enquiry Recommendations Update


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JCF Administrative Review Committee Clears JCF…Of Pretty Much Everything

Two days ago (August 8, 2017) Commissioner of Police George Quallo released the “Report of Administrative Review Committee Appointed to Review Conduct of JCF Named Officers During the 2010 West Kingston Operation and Related Matters”.

 

(Click for JCF West Kingston Administrative Review Committee Report – June 2017)

Since the release, there has been increasing discussion of the report, with expressions of criticism and concern. I have been among those expressing concerns as, having read the report, I believe it raises questions of process, substance and tone. I think that beyond the report itself, there is also the consideration of its wider impact on issues of post-Commission of Enquiry processes and of police accountability.

The Committee started its review on February 28, 2017 and concluded on June 19, 2017, having had eleven sittings. Its Terms of Reference (TOR) were as follows:JCF Administrative Review Committee TORThe members of the Committee were:JCF Admin Review Comm members

The findings of the Committee were as follows:

TOR 1

1a) 3.11 The Committee, having reviewed the Operations Plan, agreed that the Command Structure was appropriate for the task.

1b) 4.8 Having reviewed the Operations Plan, reports and statements of the JCF officers vital to the Terms of Reference, the Committee agreed that the Command Protocol was adequate.

1c & 1d) 5.10 Upon a thorough review of the conduct of the operation, the Committee agreed unanimously, that the span of control was clear and the span of command effective.

1e) 6.18 Despite the absence of the CIB participation and the delays occasioned by the prevailing circumstances, the Committee agreed that effective and adequate investigations were carried out in instances where deadly force was used.

6.19 The Committee finds that there was a system to ensure effective and adequate
investigations in the event of the resort to use of force by members of the JCF.

6.20 The Committee finds that the system was not followed according to the plan. However, the BSI rose to the occasion.

TOR 2

7.63 Upon a complete and thorough examination of the evidence, including, the Operation Plan, various reports, transcripts and statements; and for the reasons stated above, no basis could be found by the Committee, upon which any of the Named Officers should be cited for misconduct and/or dereliction of duty.

In the final account, the Committee found that the JCF, its systems, performance and members were “appropriate”, “adequate”, “clear”, “effective”, “effective”, “adequate”, “effective”, “adequate”, “rose to the occasion”, without basis to “be cited for misconduct and/or dereliction of duty”. The report and its findings give little indication of the kind of self-reflection that would be valuable to the police force following the events of 2010 and the report and recommendations of the Commission of Enquiry.  There is a sense of the-JCF-did-nothing-wrong-time-to-move-on.

As required by TOR 3, recommendations were given:JCF Admin Review Comm recommendations 1JCF Admin Review Comm recommendations 2

I have some questions about the process of the Administrative Review, including the following:

– In its June 30, 2016 press release responding to the Commission of Enquiry report, the JCF committed to establishing an Independent Administrative Review Panel which would be composed of  “one Deputy Commissioner of Police, the head of the Inspectorate of the Constabulary (IOC), one member of the Police Service Commission (PSC), one member of the Police Civilian Oversight Authority (PCOA), and one independent person, preferably an attorney at law, to be selected by the PSC and PCOA.” Why was the proposed composition for the Panel not eventually followed?

– What were the reasons that resulted in the review taking eight months to begin?

– The Committee made an initial decision not to require any of the 5 named officers to appear before it and even when one member of the Committee made a formal request for two of the officers to appear, the majority decision was not to require this. What was the reasoning behind not making use of the presence of the officers to give additional clarity during the review process?JCF Admin Review Comm methodology

There are points at which the Committee’s tone seems to be defensive and dismissive in a manner that is not appropriate or useful. One such instance of this is in a section entitled “Other Evidence”.JCF Admin Review Comm - other evidence

The assertion in 7.44 that the Commission didn’t seem to be concerned with the dangerous nature of the operation and the heavy gunfire faced by officers on the ground is hard to understand if one watched the proceedings of the Enquiry or if one has read the Commission’s report. Chapter 4, for example, is squarely focused on this matter, and its contents and findings contradict this assertion in the Administrative Review Report.WKGN COE report Ch 4 pic

The assertion in 7.44 also seems to be dismissive of the concern with collection of bodies shown by the Commission. Scores of people died during the May 2010 operation, 69 according to the Commission’s findings. This was one of the most grave outcomes of the operation. It was absolutely necessary that the Commission devote attention to uncovering information that could assist in establishing the circumstances in which these people died. The collection of bodies was not something detached from this process, as the time, location and manner of such collection could contribute valuable information.

AHHThe Office of the Public Defender has been involved from the start in the process of seeking the truth about what happened in the May 2010 operation. It is not surprising that the current Public Defender, Arlene Harrison Henry, has issued a statement about the just released JCF report. In the statement, she calls for the withdrawal of the Administrative Review Committee report and she has indicated that her Office has written to the Attorney General for an opinion on the way forward. (Click for Office of the Public Defender – Press Release re JCF Administrative Review 2017)

There is more to be said and I will deal in subsequent posts with additional aspects of the Review report and its implications.

 

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When Will The Public See The JCF Administrative Review Report, Commissioner Quallo?


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When Will The Public See The JCF Administrative Review Report, Commissioner Quallo?

Last Friday, July 28, 2017, the High Command of the Jamaica Constabulary Force (JCF) released the following statement indicating that it has completed an Administrative Review into the May 2010 operation in Western Kingston.JCF release re admin reviews - 28-7-17 aJCF release re admin reviews - 28-7-17 b

Jul.28l.17 – High Command responds to Editorial

The release referred to a Gleaner editorial (actually published on July 24, 2017), which questioned the lack of a public update regarding the JCF’s promised actions in response to the recommendations of the Western Kingston Commission of Enquiry.

The Commission’s report was tabled in Parliament on June 15, 2016, and two weeks later, on June 30, 2016, the JCF issued a press release giving its response to the recommendations made in the Commission’s report. It indicated its position regarding a number of the recommendations –  15.17, 15.18, 15.20, 15.21, 15.22, 15.27, 15.28, 15.30, 15.31 – 15.33, 15.34, 15.35 – saying what actions it intended to take in response.  I do wonder why it took 8 months more (according to last Friday’s press release) for the promised review to begin.

I hope that Commissioner Quallo will make the report public sooner rather than later; it is reportedly now being “shared with the various oversight bodies for the JCF.” Until then, the public will not be able to assess the scope and adequacy of the review or its recommendations. This public accounting is an essential part of the post-Enquiry process.

Twitter Thread

Below is a series of tweets that I made on June 30, 2017, highlighting some issues that ought to be dealt with in the JCF review report.

SG tweet 30-6-17 1SG tweet 30-6-17 2SG tweet 30-6-17 3SG tweet 30-6-17 4SG tweet 30-6-17 5SG tweet 30-6-17 6SG tweet 30-6-17 7SG tweet 30-6-17 8SG tweet 30-6-17 9SG tweet 30-6-17 10SG tweet 30-6-17 11SG tweet 30-6-17 12SG tweet 30-6-17 13SG tweet 30-6-17 14SG tweet 30-6-17 15SG tweet 30-6-17 16SG tweet 30-6-17 17

Related Blog Posts

 

 

 


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Increased Police Killings, Privacy & Other Concerns: INDECOM’S 1st Quarterly Report 2017

Jamaica’s Independent Commission of Investigations (INDECOM) is a Commission of Parliament mandated “to undertake investigations concerning actions by members of the Security Forces and other agents of the State that result in death or injury to persons or the abuse of the rights of persons”. (INDECOM Act) The Commission began work in late 2010 and submits annual and quarterly reports to Parliament; these reports are available to the public and many are posted on INDECOM’s website. The reports give both data and analysis regarding the complaints and incidents investigated; they also include reviews of issues of concern to the Commission. In the past, these issues have included

  • deaths in custody
  • deaths of the mentally ill in confrontation with the police
  • command responsibility for the use of force
  • the School Resource Officers Programme
  • firing at vehicles.

1st Quarterly Report 2017

INDECOM 1st Quarterly Report 2017

The 1st Quarterly Report – 2017 was tabled in Parliament earlier this month and INDECOM held a press conference last Friday (May 26, 2017) to discuss the contents of the report.

Part One of the report gives information about new complaints received by INDECOM during the first three months of 2017 and lists the names of the security force-related fatalities, giving the location of each incident and which state agency was involved in the fatality.

Other information, such as Fatal Shootings by Parish, is given.

INDECOM 1st Q report 2017 p 11 chart

Part Two  of the report deals with the work of the Legal Department. It gives information on the Commission’s completed reports for the period and gives details of the recommendations of the Legal Department in 51 fatal shooting incidents. Most of these incidents took place between 2011 – 2015, but there is one case from 2008 and another from 2010. In the majority of these cases, there was the recommendation that no criminal charge be laid or disciplinary action be taken, and that the file be forwarded to the Special Coroner. In one case there was the recommendation that a policeman be charged with murder and in another case there was a confirmation of the DPP’s decision to charge a policeman with murder. INDECOM 1st Q 2017 - cases 1-2INDECOM 1st Q 2017 - case 15INDECOM 1st Q 2017 - case 22INDECOM 1st Q 2017 - case 33

The report also indicates the arrests and charges during the first quarter:INDECOM 1st Q 2017 - arrests and chanrges

Part Three of the report is on Lessons Learnt. It contains alarming data about the sharp increase in the number of people killed by the security forces in the first three months of 2017, when compared to the same period last year – a 75% increase.  This sets out in report form information that INDECOM has already communicated during the year.

The decline in security force fatalities, from above 200 killed per annum, for many years, fell to 115 in 2014. This was a 55% reduction. Fatalities dropped to 101 in 2015 and 111 in 2016.

However, the first quarter of 2017 (Jan – March) has seen a 75% increase in fatal shootings over the same period of 2016; 42 fatalities as against 24 in 2016. NB. 42 fatalities was not reached until mid-May, in 2016.

Fatal shootings in January, 2017, amounted to 19, a figure last observed in January 2014. Explanations provided by the JCF for this increase and subsequent months was reported as a rise in police confrontations with criminal gangs. (p. 31)

INDECOM press conference 26-5-17

Left to right: Denyelle Anderson (Public Relations Officer), Terrence Williams (Commissioner) , Hamish Campbell (Assistant Commissioner)

At the press conference, INDECOM Assistant Commissioner Hamish Campbell gave an update in the number of fatalities, stating that as of May 25, 2017, 64 people had been killed, compared to 44 by the same date in 2016. This is a 45% increase, which is still an alarming figure. He also reported that as of that date, the combined number of people shot and killed or shot and injured by the security forces was 87.

Mr Campbell also spoke about the fact that  46% of the people shot and killed or injured by the security forces in the first quarter of 2017 were not in possession of a firearm and 32% of them were completely unarmed.

INDECOM pictograph p. 31

Pictograph 1: Persons killed or injured without a firearm or in possession of non-firearm weapon (p. 31)

 

The section contains further information about these incidents and concludes as follows:

INDECOM 1st Q report 2017 p 33

Part Four of the report gives information about INDECOM’s meetings with the JCF, its outreach activities and press releases issued.

Additionally, the First Quarterly Report has an article on the issue of privacy and policing, dealing with surveillance, CCTV cameras and the need for regulations in Jamaica governing their use. There is also a review of the Major Organised Crime & Anti-Corruption (MOCA) Bill before Parliament and the concerns INDECOM has about aspects of the Bill. INDECOM Commissioner Terrence Williams spoke about these two issues at the press conference and I will comment on them in a separate blog post.

INDECOM’s Reports are a useful mechanism for the public to track the work of the Commission and some issues of great importance to the society. It is a shame that they are not the subject of more discussion and debate in the Parliament itself.

 


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Nearly A Year Later: Time for Western Kingston Commission of Enquiry Recommendations Update

Next week will be seven years since the Jamaica Defence Force (JDF) and the Jamaica Constabulary Force (JCF) joint operation in Western Kingston which resulted in the death of more than 70 people. Next month will be a year since the report of the Western Kingston Commission of Enquiry was tabled in Parliament and made public. It is certainly time for the country to get a full update on the status of the recommendations made in the report.

COE report cover blog pic

This is one of the problems with the Commission of Enquiry process. An Enquiry takes place and at the end of the process, strong and pertinent recommendations are sometimes made. At that point, another process starts or should start, but there is no formal requirement ensuring that next phase. There should be a system whereby the government is required to outline publicly which of the recommendations it has accepted, what steps it intends to take towards implementation and the timelines associated with that implementation. There should also be a formal process whereby the government is required to give periodic official public updates on the progress of that implementation, perhaps through scheduled reports to Parliament. This is not a new problem and contributes in part to the widely held belief that Commissions of Enquiry are a waste of time and money, as nothing ever comes of them.

Delroy Chuck MOJThe Minister of Justice, Delroy Chuck has attempted to move in that direction, having given some updates from time to time in Parliament and otherwise, updates about the setting up of a Cabinet Committee, the selection of the Chair of the Compensation Committee and the start of the Committee’s work, and the intention of the Government to apologise, for example. There have been statements by the JDF and the JCF indicating that they were working on some of the recommendations that applied to them. But this is an ad hoc process, and though things may well have progressed beyond what the public is aware of, there has been no formal, predictable structure for any updates.

In his Budget Debate presentation in Parliament on March 21, 2017, Prime Minister Andrew Holness committed to apologising to victims of the Tivoli operation when he said:

The wrongs of the past must be acknowledged and an apology offered to the victims of state-inflicted violence as recommended by constituted review bodies. On behalf of the Jamaican State and in my capacity as Prime Minister I will make the apology in Parliament to victims of the Tivoli Incursion and the Coral Gardens Incident.

PM Holness 2017 Budget DebateThe Prime Minister has made the apology for Coral Gardens, but hasn’t yet apologised for the abuses during the operation in Western Kingston and no date has been given for when he will. He made no other specific reference to the Commission’s recommendations during his presentation. Additionally, neither Minister Chuck nor Minister of National Security Robert Montague made specific reference to the Commission’s recommendations during their recent Sectoral Debate presentations or used the occasion to give a specific update on progress with implementation of the recommendations.  Also, I am not aware of any comprehensive public updates from the JDF and JCF after their initial responses to the Commission’s report.

I may well have missed some updates that have been given in Parliament or elsewhere, and I am sure that I could find additional information if I made Access to Information requests to various government ministries and bodies. I could also probably find additional information by searching the Hansard record for relevant dates. But the information ought to be more easily accessible and we should have some prescribed timelines for updates. I would like to suggest that sometime in June, twelve months after the Commission’s report was tabled in Parliament, would be a good time for a comprehensive update on what progress has been made on each of the Commission’s recommendations. The update should clearly state whether any progress has been made, the nature of that progress and what remains to be done, including relevant timelines. Instances in which no further action is planned should also be clearly stated. And as these updates are being contemplated and given, it is important to acknowledge again that this isn’t simply a paper exercise. It is about real people who were directly or indirectly impacted by the events, about a government giving account to its people, about preventing such occurrences happening again and about a process of justice and healing.

Recommendations of the Western Kingston Commission of Enquiry

Below I will set out briefly the recommendations made in Chapter 15 of the Report, for which progress updates need to be given.

UPDATE NEEDED REGARDING STATUS OF IMPLENTATION OF RECOMMENDATIONS INCLUDED IN REPORT OF WESTERN KINGSTON COMMISSION OF ENQUIRY CONCLUDED IN 2016
SECTION OF CHAPTER 15 RECOMMENDATIONS COMMENTS
INTRODUCTION 15.1 The Commission indicates that in other Chapters in the report they “have recommended that further investigations be carried out as a matter of justice and with a view to preventing a recurrence of similar events.” The bodies responsible for the further investigations, such as the JCF and INDECOM, should give an update on the status of such investigations.
PART 1-REDRESS

1. APOLOGY

 

15.7 “…we recommend that the GoJ apologize in Parliament to the people of West Kingston and Jamaica as a whole for the excesses of the security forces during the operation. The Government is, in the last resort, responsible for the conduct of its security forces.” The Prime Minister has indicated in Parliament that he will make this apology. He should indicate the date on which he will apologise and carry this out.
2. COUNSELLING FOR TRAUMATISED PERSONS

 

 

15.8 “…we are satisfied that there needs to be a programme of continuing counselling for some of the residents including children.”

 

15.9 “We therefore recommend that this matter be pursued by the appropriate Ministry.”

The Government should indicate which Ministry is responsible for implementing this recommendation, what programme is in place and what counselling has been and will be provided.
3. COMPENSATION FOR VICTIMS 15.12 “…we recommend the establishment of a Compensation Committee with two broad mandates…”

15.13 “We respectfully further recommend that the Compensation Committee be chaired by a retired judge or senior attorney-atlaw…and the Committee should be directed to complete its work within 9 months.”

The Chair of the Compensation Committee could give an indication of the progress of the Committee in its work and should indicate whether it will complete its work within the recommended 9-month period.
4. WAIVER OF LIMITATION PERIOD 15.14 The Commission refers to the legal restrictions regarding the timeframe in which claims against the State can be brought, 3 years in some instances and 6 years in others.

 

15.15 “We therefore recommend that the State waive its strict legal rights to all claims and agree to settle compensation on an ex gratia basis in respect of claims brought by aggrieved persons, personal representatives and/or near relations and/or dependents of deceased persons.”

The Government needs to confirm its position regarding the recommended waiver.

 

The Office of the Public Defender should give an update regarding its participation as referenced in 15.15

PART 2 -PREVENTION

 

15.16 The Commission gives a non-exhaustive list of measures that would prevent similar events in the future.
1. ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEWS 15.17 “Consistent with our findings with regard to the conduct of certain officers and other ranks of the JCF and JDF, we recommend that both forces undertake administrative reviews of the conduct of the named officers….We note that since May 2010, some of these officers have been promoted – in some cases to very senior ranks.”

 

15.18 “We recommend that the serving police officers against whom adverse findings have been made be relieved of any operational commands that they may hold and that they be prohibited from serving in any special operations units.”

 

15.19 The Commission indicated the allegations of involvement of members of the Mobile Reserve in extra-judicial killings.

 

15.20 “Where the accusations of extra-judicial killings on the part of the security forces were found by this Commission to be credible, and where persons were identified as being in dereliction of duty or were administratively or operationally incompetent, we recommend that these persons should never again be allowed to lead or otherwise participate in internal security operations.”

 

15.21 “We further recommend that the Mobile Reserve be subjected to special external oversight arrangements.”

The JCF and JDF should give an update on the status of the recommended administrative reviews of the named officers.

 

The JCF should give an update regarding the recommendation to relieve certain officers of operational command.

 

The Government should give an update regarding the recommended special external oversight arrangements for Mobile Reserve.

2. USE OF WEAPONS SYSTEMS 15.22 The Commission pointed to the need for “policies that guide the selection of weapons systems that may be used in internal security operations….We strongly recommend that a group of competent persons be tasked to draft such a policy.”

 

Future use of Mortars and other Indirect Fire Weapons

15.24 “We therefore recommend that, in future, the leadership of the JDF pay careful regard to contemporary best practice and learning in relation to the use of weapons of indirect fire. Consistent with international humanitarian law, the use of these weapons in built-up areas should be prohibited.”

 

 

The Government should indicate the status of drafting policies regarding selection of weapons systems for internal security operations.

 

The JDF should indicate the status of its review of future use of mortars and other indirect fire weapons.

3. IMPROVING LEGAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE ACCOUNTABILITY FOR USE OF FORCE 15.27 “…we recommend the following firearm related systems and procedures for favourable consideration by the GoJ:” These are set out in (a) – (e).

 

 

 

 

 

Use of Masks or Other Concealment Gear

15.28 “…we recommend that the use of masks and/or other concealment gear be limited to special cases when the identities of particular officers and units are best protected by these means. We also recommend that where masks and other concealment gear are used by entire units or groups, this be done only with the approval of the CDS and CoP for the JDF and JCF respectively….Moreover, we recommend that in all cases, there be reliable and verifiable means of internally identifying all individuals for whom approval is given to wear masks and or other concealment gear….

 

Body Worn Cameras

15.32 “This recommendation should also apply to soldiers who participate in special policing operations.”

15.33 The Commission recommends the use of body worn cameras by the police. “We therefore recommend the introduction of this type of technology.”

 

 

The Government should give an update regarding the status of the recommendations to do with firearm related systems and procedures; for several of these, the JCF’s update would be relevant.

 

 

The government should give an update regarding the policy regarding wearing of masks or other concealment gear; the JDF and JCF updates would be relevant here.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

The Government should give an update regarding the implementation of the recommendation for the use of body worn cameras by the JCF and JDF. The JCF update would be relevant here.

 

Of particular note is the status of the protocols to govern use of body worn cameras. Body worn cameras are now being used by some members of the JCF. Earlier this year, INDECOM indicated that at that time it did not know what the protocols were; the public also does not know what the protocols are.

4. ACCOUNTABILITY IN JOINT OPERATIONS – A TRANSITION COMMAND PROTOCOL 15.34 “We recommend that the JDF and JCF fashion a transition command protocol that would be applied in instances of large-scale joint internal security operations.” The JDF and JCF should give an update regarding the status of this recommended protocol.
5. STRENGTHEN OVERSIGHT OF THE JCF 15.35 “We recommend that they [INDECOM, PCOA & PSC] be strengthened in terms of their capacities to fulfill their functions effectively.” The Government should give an update regarding measures taken to strengthen the capacities of INDECOM, the PCOA & the PSC.
6. OVERSIGHT OF THE JDF’S INVOLVEMENT IN POLICING OPERATIONS 15.36 “…to the extent that the JDF has become routinely involved in policing and is required to play a major role in internal security operations, it is our view that this aspect of their work, that is, their policing work, should be subjected to a greater measure of external civilian oversight.” The Government should give an update regarding this recommendation to increase external civilian oversight of the JDF’s policing work . The JDF’s update would be relevant in this regard.
7. TACKLING THE GARRISON PHENOMENON 15.41 The Commission noted the establishment of a police post in Tivoli Gardens after May 24, 2010 and recommended “that this approach be replicated in those garrison constituencies where none presently exists.”

 

 

15.42 “In addition, since “de-garrisonisation” ultimately requires consensus among political parties, we recommend

a. A bi-partisan approach leading to agreement towards the dismantling of garrison communities facilitated by an independent third party.

b. A road map for “de-garrisonisation” should be handed over to an independent body similarly structured in composition to the Electoral Commission, to develop the details of the process.

 

15.43 In relation to “de-garrisonisation”, the Commission made several recommendations to do with allocation of resources, set out in (i) – (iii).

 

The Government should give an update regarding the recommendation to establish police posts in garrison constituencies which did not have one. The JCF update would be relevant in this regard.

 

The Government should give updates about the implementation of the recommendations regarding the process and the allocation of resources relating to “de-garrisonisation”.

8. ACTION RECOMMENDATIONS OF ECLAC 15.45 The Commission endorsed the recommendations made by ECLAC in its report on the impact of the May 2010 events in Jamaica.

 

15.46 The Commission also “endorsed the main conclusion of the report that a medium to long-term programme of rehabilitation and revitalisation of the affected communities should be developed in order to integrate those communities into Jamaican society.”

 

15.47 “As part of a programme for inner city renewal and development we recommend that the Government should vigorously pursue the private sector’s assistance by inviting them to embrace the Urban Renewal (Tax Relief) Act.”

The Government should give an update regarding the recommendations to do with “[s]ustainable development… in addressing the problems in the low-income urban areas.”
9. REVIEW AND REFORM OF THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 15.48 “We recommend that there should be a thorough-going holistic review of the existing criminal justice system followed thereafter by appropriate administrative and legislative action.” The Government should give an update regarding this recommended review.
10. AMENDMENT OF EXTRADITION ACT 15.50 “We recommend that section 8 of the Extradition Act be amended to make it mandatory that the Minister make a decision on authority to proceed within a finite time.”

 

15.51 The Commission made recommendations regarding not publicizing extradition requests and the Attorney General’s intention to sign the Authority to Proceed. Also recommended AG immediately informing the Commissioner of Police upon its execution.

The government should give an update regarding the recommended amendment to the Extradition Act.

 

 


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Yes, You Do Get to Ask Questions About the Zones of Special Operations Act

You are asked as a citizen to trust the Government and that trust is an important part of how a democracy works. But in a democracy, that trust is never expected to be blind or unquestioning; it is expected to be qualified and earned on an ongoing basis. Good governance is participatory, with opportunities for sharing of information and genuine consultation and feedback on decisions that will affect the lives of citizens.

Budget debate 21-3-17 Holness cLast week, during his contribution to the Budget Debate, Prime Minister Andrew Holness tabled a Bill aimed at legal provisions for dealing with the problem of crime and security in Jamaica.Law Reform Special Zones bill

The short title for the proposed legislation is The Law Reforms (Zones of Special Operations) (Special Security and Community Development Measures) Act, 2017 and the Bill can be found on Parliament’s website. (Click here.)  PM Holness said the following about the Bill:

The referral to a Joint Select Committee will provide an opportunity for members of the public to hear more about the details of the Bill and to make written submissions to the Committee.

People are sometimes given the impression or make the assumption themselves that unless you are a legislator, a lawyer, an expert in the particular field, you are not entitled to express an opinion on an existing or proposed piece of legislation. We all benefit from the knowledge, expertise and opinions of legislators, lawyers and experts, but that does not mean that as a citizen you do not have the right to express concerns or ask questions about a piece of legislation that is likely to affect you, your family and community directly or indirectly. It is part of what citizens in a democracy are entitled (and expected) to do, part of how we participate other than by voting.

Over the weekend, I read through the Zones of Special Operations Bill, making notes of my initial thoughts, areas of concern or for clarification and questions. I’ve shared my notes below, as I continue to look at and follow the process regarding the Bill. The current provision is for the first review of the Act to take place within three years; often reviews are delayed and even when they take place and are reported on, recommendations for amendments can take years to be debated in Parliament. So it is necessary that the Bill be subject to closer scrutiny before passage.

******************************************************************************************

Having read the Bill, I have some initial thoughts and comments on areas for question and clarification and possible concerns that arise.

One thing that would be very useful in evaluating the impact of the Bill would be a matrix setting out what new powers have been allocated and to whom and where existing powers have been repeated in this Bill.

Some areas to look at particularly:

  • increased powers to JDF
  • increased powers to JCF
  • impact of the Bill on children
  • impact on freedom of association
  • impact on detention and bail
  • provisions for use of body-worn cameras
  • increased powers to Prime Minister
  • potential for powers within Zones to influence attitudes & actions of security forces outside of Zones
  • provisions for oversight & accountability of operations/actions within Zones (eg functioning of INDECOM within Zones)
  • any others?

In assessing the Bill, one would need to look at the impact of the proposed Act on the fundamental rights and freedoms of citizens; the potential effectiveness of provisions in the Act; whether powers/provisions detailed within the Act already exist in law.

Comments on specific sections of the Bill

Memorandum of Objects and Reasons for the Act

In the Memorandum of Objects and Reasons for the Act, it is specifically stated that:

“This Act should not have the negative impact on Jamaica, which could likely occur if a declaration of a state of public emergency was made.”

This raises the question of whether the Act seeks to establish the conditions of a state of public emergency in specified geographical locations without the existing process/protection/Parliamentary oversight and the constitutional implications of this.

Additionally, the following is stated in the Memorandum of Objects and Reasons for the Act, which raises the need for clarity about any additional powers the Bill seeks to give members of the JCF and JDF and, as indicated here, the impact of these on the fundamental rights and freedoms of citizens. Is the balance an acceptable one? Consideration should be given to whether the powers granted here may influence (unintentionally?) the role/behavior of the police and military outside of any declared special zone or generally over the long term. Note the experience of the long-term impact on policing of the Suppression of Crime Act passed in the 1970s.Special Zones 1

Objects of Act 3(a) – (g)

This section sets out the specific objects of the Act regarding the Zones of special operations. It would be useful to clarify which of the powers listed here already exist in law and which are new. If they already exist in law, what need for the Act?

Declaration of Zone 4 (1) – (5)

Note the increased powers being given to the Prime Minister (in Council) and to the Joint Command (as designated in 8(a)).

Note (4) The entire Island shall not be declared as a Zone. Is there any limitation as to the number of Zones or % of the Island that can be designated as a Zone at any one time?

Extension of period 5(1) – (3)

With the initial period of up to 60 days allowed in 4(1) and the two extensions of up to 60 days each allowed in 5(1) & (2), an area can be designated as a Zone of special operation for up to 180 days (6 months) before being brought to Parliament for a vote.

When brought to Parliament, 5(3) Any subsequent extension shall be subject to affirmative resolution of the House of Representatives.

Would there be a limit to the length of time of such further extensions? Would it be the 60 days as with the prior extensions? Would there be a limit to the number of times such extensions could be declared? Would there be any mechanism other than the courts for residents within a declared zone to challenge such extensions?

Statement to Parliament (6)

Within fourteen days of each extension the Minister shall make a statement to Parliament.

Does this requirement exist for the initial declaration also, or only for extensions?

This is aimed at some Parliamentary accountability, and perhaps oversight. How effective could/would it be?

Designation of Joint Command 8(1) – (5)

8(1) What exactly does “to be jointly in charge of operations within the Zone” mean?

8(2) What level of additional training is envisaged in “are additionally trained in human rights, the use of force and community development initiatives”?

8(3) Will the details of the Zones’ “written accountability and reporting system as specified by the National Security Council” be available for review by anyone else to assess the adequacy of the system? INDECOM? The public?

8(5) Any person who fails to comply with subsection (4) is liable to disciplinary action.

Note the reference to disciplinary action here and elsewhere in Bill. Clarity on who will be responsible for administering such disciplinary action. JCF & JDF each to their own members?

Suspension of operation or change of Joint Command: 10

Note power of PM (in Council).

Identification of members of Joint Force: 11

Special Zones 2

This will not be standard? Does “may be ascertained” include being ascertained by the public?

Concern here about ability of public to identify police and soldiers on operations, given the context of long-standing and ongoing concerns about wearing of masks/face-coverings and non-display/covering of numbers on uniforms. Note, for example, concerns and comments in Report of Tivoli Commission of Enquiry.

Concern for the safety of members of JCF & JDF is usually raised as the reason for concealing identity of some members on some operations. Unfortunately, there has been in the past lack of acknowledgement of this practice by the hierarchy of the JCF, certainly, and a sense that such concealment is not subject to specific and recorded approval. There has also been a failure in recording of presence of specific members who participate in operations and where they would be assigned at any particular time. This has resulted in inability to identify members who may have been involved in alleged abuses. Again, see concerns and comments in Report of Tivoli Commission of Enquiry.

Powers of Joint Command to establish cordons and impose curfews: 12(1) – (2)

Clarify how this varies current powers/process to establish cordons and impose curfews.

Note that (2) specifically grants to members of the JDF in Zones the powers of a constable.

Duration of cordon and curfew: 13

Check current duration allowed for cordons and curfews.

Search and seizure: 14

Clarify which of these powers already exist in law and which are new.

Of particular note are instances in which members of the JDF are being granted powers that they do not already have or would not have outside of Zones.

Arrest or detention: 16

This clause needs to be gone through clarifying any variance with existing law. Again, particular note needs to be made of any increase in powers granted to the JDF.

Review role of Justice of the Peace in this clause.

2(a) How is “unless the circumstances are such that the person should know” determined?

Special Zones 3

Persons held in custody: 17 (1) – (2)

Any changes to existing law?

17(2) What time period is meant by “forthwith” in “…and shall cause such person to be brought forthwith before a Justice of the Peace”?

Just noting that the provisions under this Act will affect all persons arrested or detained for any offence in these Zones, not just those persons or offences related to the high crime factors referred to in the Memorandum of Objects and Reasons.

Treatment of persons arrested or detained: 18 (1) – (7)

Review against existing law.

If adhered to in practice, 17(3) would be important. But would it be adhered to in practice?

Use of body-worn cameras: 19 (1) – (2)

This clause deals with the wearing of body-worn cameras in the Zones and (2) requires the following:

Special Zones 4

with 2(a) – (g) setting out some of the specifics to be included in the protocols and procedures.

The head of the JCF’s communications unit recently stated that there are internal protocols which guide the use of body-worn cameras by the JCF. At the time, the head of INDECOM stated that such protocols hadn’t been shared with INDECOM. I don’t know whether they have been shared with INDECOM subsequently. They certainly haven’t been shared with the public.

I would question why the establishment and review of protocols and procedures for use of body-worn cameras in these Zones would be left to the Chief of Defence Staff and the Commissioner of Police. Would protocols governing body-worn cameras within the Zones differ from those for use otherwise/generally? Wouldn’t it be better to have a standardized practice for the entire country? Will INDECOM be involved in the development and/or review of such protocols – general or within Zones –  as set out in Bill? Will the public be entitled to know what these protocols and practices are?

Registration of weapons: 20

Special Zones 5

Why the qualifier? Would they be required to give reasons for such a decision? To whom?

Thinking generally about oversight for actions within the Zones.

Duty to disclose identity on request: 21(1) – (4)

Compare with existing law.

Note offence and punishment in 21(4).

Duty under law for the protection of children: 22

Special Zones 6

Consider any implications of this provision.

22 (a) Implications of this expansion of power to any/all members of JCF and JDF in a Zone. Too broad? Could intention be accomplished by referral to existing Attendance Officers?

Was this included in response to questions regarding under what law police in certain communities have exercised certain authority over children there?

Establishment of Social Intervention Committee: 23(1) – (2)

What resources will be available for the functioning of the Committees? Funds? Support staff? Office space? Etc?

Often the effectiveness of committees is hampered by lack of resources, even fairly basic ones.

Functions of Committee: 24(1) – (4)

Review the functions. Note 24(2) re TOR of Committees.

Regulations: 25

“The Minister may make regulations for the better carrying out ot the provisions and purposes of this Act.” Not “shall make regulations”? In past instances, the failure to pass accompanying regulations has hampered the proper implementation of an Act.

Review of Act by Parliamentary Committee: 26(1) – (2)

26(2) The first review not later than 3 years after declaration of first Zone.

First Schedule – Social Intervention Committee

Constitution of Committee: 1(a) – (u)

“The Committee shall be comprised of at least ten persons selected from among the following – “

Twenty-one people/categories of people are offered, from which at least ten are to be chosen. Of the twenty-one, seventeen are explicitly state/government representatives; two are explicitly community representatives; two – (g) and (u) – could be state/government or non-state/government. This seems to skew to composition of the Social Intervention Committees towards being predominantly state/government in composition.

Procedure and meetings: 5(1) – (7)

5(2) By what mechanism would the community be able to make a call for a meeting of the committee? Would it be dependent on getting the requisite number of committee members to support such a call? Or would there be some other mechanism?

5(5) Would minutes be available to public routinely? Or dependent on ATI requests?

Second Schedule – Amendment of other Enactments

General need to review and be clear on all the changes to existing laws being made here.

Constabulary Force Act

Look at specifics of changes being proposed.

Criminal Justice (Suppression of Criminal Organization) Act

The three New Parts to be inserted into the existing Act need to be reviewed for the implications of the provisions contained in them. Provisions regarding interim control orders and control orders are of particular note.

1A – Declaration of Criminal Organization,

1B – Control of Members of Criminal Organizations and

1C – Registers of Criminal Organization and Controlled Members of Criminal Organizations

Firearms Act

Look at the New Sections – 42A, 42B and 42C – to be inserted in existing Act. Implications?

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Some other laws to consider in reviewing this Bill

The Constitution of Jamaica

The Emergency Powers Act

The Constabulary Force Act

The Defence Act

The Education Act

The Child Care and Protection Act

Criminal Justice (Suppression of Criminal Organization) Act

The Firearms Act


4 Comments

Advertising for Police Commissioner & Other Public Posts

Deputy Commissioner of Police (DCP) Novelette Grant will assume the position of Acting-Commissioner on January 7, 2017, when the current Commissioner’s resignation takes effect. Commissioner Carl Williams’ resignation became public on December 22, 2016, when his resignation letter, submitted weeks earlier, was leaked. Commissioner Williams explained that the timing and manner in which his resignation became public knowledge wasn’t the best, as it had been planned that the news wouldn’t be made public until the selection of Acting-Commissioner had been completed. rjr-report-on-resignation-of-cop-williams-22-12-16This RJR report (including an audio clip from his interview with journalist Dionne Jackson Miller) was one of many media reports dealing with the news of Commissioner Williams’ resignation at the time.

The Ministry of National Security quickly issued a press release  thanking Commissioner Williams for his service and dealing with other issues connected with the resignation and replacement process. (mns-police-commissioner-to-demit-office-22-12-16)

dcp-novelette-grantThe following day, the Police Service Commission (PSC) announced that DCP Grant would act as Commissioner during the search period, a process that is expected to take 90 days. In a speech on Sunday (Jan 1, 2017), DCP Grant made the pragmatic statement that there would be no miracles in the process of dealing with crime and none should be expected of her.

Also on Sunday, the advertisement for the post of Commissioner was carried in the press. It focussed on the duties and responsibilities of Commissioner and set out the deadline and contacts for submission of applications. DCP Grant is so far the only person to have publicly declared an intention to apply for the post and she is, in fact, a very likely candidate for selection.

gleaner-advt-for-commissioner-of-police-1-1-17-pt-1gleaner-advt-for-commissioner-of-police-1-1-17-pt-2

I think that the advertisement posted is seriously lacking in one regard. It does not set out in any specificity the qualifications and experience required of applicants for the post of Commissioner of Police. What level of experience in law enforcement is required? Must experience be within policing or will experience in some other context be considered, for example the military, correctional services or private security? Is there a minimum number of years of experience necessary for consideration? What level of supervisory/managerial experience is required? What are the preferred and minimum educational requirements for the post? These are a few of the requirements that could reasonably be expected to be specified in such an advertisement. It would also be useful to know if the PSC is advertising the post outside of Jamaica, regionally or further afield.

I have long thought that this is an approach that should be taken routinely when advertising vacant public posts, not just for the current vacancy for Commissioner of Police. It gives the public a clearer idea of the criteria considered important for successful fulfilment of the job. It also gives the public a basis for evaluating how well the candidate eventually appointed meets the required qualifications and experience for the post. This would support the increased move towards transparency and accountability required in modern approaches to good governance. It is not too late for the PSC to adopt this approach, and perhaps it is time for this to become routine and required when advertising  vacancies for public posts in Jamaica.