

Ministry of National Security

A New Era of Policing in Jamaica:
Transforming the JCF

Appendices to the Report of the
Strategic Review Panel

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1. Appendix A - Biographies of Panel members

CHAIR – DR. HEBERT J. THOMPSON, C.D, PHD, J.P.

Dr. Herbert Thompson is the President of the Northern Caribbean University. He is a member of the Electoral Commission and has served on several Committees such as the Consultative Committee on Crime and Violence, Joint Committee for Tertiary Education, National Consultation on Values and Attitudes - American Association of Cell Biology, Rotary Club of Mandeville, Ethics Integrity Committee - Bank of Nova Scotia Jamaica Ltd, Adventist Accreditation Association and the Electoral Advisory Committee. Dr. Thompson holds a Bachelor of Science Degree in Biology, Masters of Science Degrees in Physiology and Biochemistry and a Doctorate in Biochemistry.

MR. CAL CORLEY

Mr. Cal Corley is Chief Superintendent of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police. He recently assumed responsibility as the Director General, National Compensation Services with the mandate to implement significant reform. He has extensive experience as a police officer, senior manager and executive in areas such as criminal intelligence, national security, drug enforcement, human resources and change management. He has also served as a National Security Policy Advisor at the Privy Council Office. Mr. Corley holds a Master of Business Administration degree.

MR. NOEL ELDRIDGE, O.D., J.P.

Mr. Noel Eldridge acted as Commissioner of Police for three (3) months prior to retiring from the Jamaica Constabulary Force in 1997. He was the Deputy Commissioner of Police in charge of Administration. Mr. Eldridge joined the Jamaica Constabulary Force in 1957 and worked in intelligence as a Detective for twenty nine (29) years. He rose to second in Command at the Special Branch Head Quarters. He was later promoted as Assistant Commissioner in charge of Training and then appointed as the Commanding Officer for Area ONE. He has served as a member on the Board of the Firearm Licensing Authority and in 2005 he was made a member of the Order of Distinction (Officer Class).

PROFESSOR CLIFFORD SHEARING

Professor Clifford Shearing holds the Chair of Criminology at the Faculty of Law, University of Cape Town where he directs the University's Centre of Criminology. He also holds the South African National Research Foundation's Chair on African Security and Justice. Previous appointments include professorships at the University of Toronto and the Australian National University. He has served on various commissions, including the Independent Commission on Policing for Northern Ireland (the Patten Commission).

MR. PETER H. MOSES

Peter H. Moses is a Vice President of Citibank, responsible for the Corporate Bank in Jamaica. Mr. Moses has received several awards and is recognized for his involvement in Jamaica's business community. His most recent award was the Jamaica National Civil Award, Commander of Distinction (2000). He is the past President for a number of organizations; these include the Jamaica Bankers Association, the American Chamber of Commerce, the Jamaica Foundation for Children, the Salvation Army Advisory Board and the Private Sector Organization of Jamaica. He

has also served as a Director of the Jamaica Exporters Association, the National Council on Drug Abuse, The Calabar Old Boys Association, the Mona School of Business and President of the Real Mona Football Club. Peter Moses has a Bachelors degree in Economics from Carnegie Mellon University.

MR. HUBERT WILLIAMS

Mr. Hubert Williams is the President of the Police Foundation in Washington, D.C., USA, and is a 30-year veteran of policing. He sits on a number of advisory boards and commissions, including Drug Strategies, The Constitution Project, the National Committee on the Right to Counsel, the American Judicature Society Commission on Forensic Science and Public Policy, the Council on Foreign Relations Independent Task Force on Civil Liberties and National Security, the National Law Enforcement Officers Memorial Fund, and the National Institute of Justice Operations Research Focus Group. He was founding President of the National Organization of Black Law Enforcement Executives (NOBLE). Mr. Williams earned a Bachelor of Science degree from The John Jay College of Criminal Justice and a Juris Doctorate from Rutgers University School of Law.

THE HON. MISS SHIRLEY TYNDALL, O.J., C.D.

Miss Shirley Tyndall joined the Civil Service in 1959 and served in the Collector General's Department until she joined the staff of the Ministry of Finance & Planning in 1970. She was appointed to the post of Accountant General in 1987. She was later appointed as the Financial Secretary in 1989, a post she held until 2005 when she retired from the Public Sector. Miss Tyndall was formerly Chairman of Financial Institutions Services Limited and the Jamaica Urban Transit Company. She was a Director on the Board of the Bank of Jamaica, Jamaica Pegasus Hotel, Clarendon Alumina Production Limited (CAP), Financial Sector Adjustment Company (FINSAC) Limited, and Telecommunications of Jamaica. Currently Miss Tyndall serves as Chairman of the National Contracts Commission and the Vital Statistics Commission and sits on the Board of the Area Youth Foundation. Miss Tyndall holds a Bachelor's Degree in Economics and Administration.

MR. JOHN YATES, QPM

John Yates is currently an Assistant Commissioner in the Metropolitan Police Service (MPS) (New Scotland Yard, London.) He is Head of the Specialist Crime Directorate and is responsible for some 5,500 staff and a budget of £375million. He leads on the management and oversight of reactive investigations into all homicide and serious crime, child protection, economic and specialist crime, as well as covert policing and intelligence-led operations into serious and organised criminality. He is a member of the MPS Management Board, the Association of Chief Police Officers' lead for Rape and Serious Sexual Offences and he is a member of the International Group of Experts on Corruption (IGEC) Committee. Additionally, he is a member of the Prince's Trust London Council. Mr Yates has extensive experience in the management and investigation of complex, high profile cases. He led the UK policing response to the South East Asian Tsunami and the MPS response to the Shooting at Stockwell of Jean Charles de Menezes. He also led the recent investigation known as 'Cash for Peerages'. In January 2006, he was awarded the Queen's Police Medal for distinguished services to policing.

2. Appendix B - Terms of reference

MINISTRY OF NATIONAL SECURITY JCF STRATEGIC REVIEW TERMS OF REFERENCE FOR JCF STRATEGIC REVIEW PANEL

A. Background

1. In keeping with its commitment to transform Jamaica's national security environment and completely modernize its law enforcement infrastructure, the Government of Jamaica (GoJ) is conducting a major strategic review of the JCF, which will provide the empirical bases for the adoption of strategies required to enhance and strengthen the organization's capacity to fulfill its mandate.

The Strategic Review is expected to thoroughly examine the policies, standards and performance of the Jamaica Constabulary Force, and to make recommendations aimed at establishing internationally accepted policing standards within the Force. Its major objectives include, *inter alia*:

1. Enhancement of accountability mechanisms governing the operations of the JCF;
2. Review of management and organizational structure, and the development of recommendations to ensure professionalism, efficiency, and enhanced competence of the entire organization;
3. Development of appropriate standards in recruitment, training, and professional development to ensure adherence to internationally accepted best practices;
4. Improvement of public confidence in policing;
5. Review of the legislative and administrative framework governing the JCF, including the JCF Act.

Scope of Work of the Review Panel

In its scope of work, the strategic review of the JCF is expected to:

1. Review the Legislative Framework for the JCF and its auxiliaries, assess the relevance and responsiveness to current policing realities and propose amendments. In particular, conduct a full evaluation of the Police Service Regulations, and the Book of Rules and make recommendations for specific amendments that will facilitate effective disciplinary action;
2. Assess the effectiveness and relevance of current policing strategies and operational procedures to deal with the levels and nature of criminality, the prevalence of unlawful behaviour and public disorder in the society and with due regard for the challenges posed by the character of some communities;
3. Assess operational competencies and effectiveness in the execution of various operations including investigations, and community policing;
4. Explore and evaluate a wide range of institutional issues including, inter-alia:

- the appropriateness, effectiveness and efficiency of the current organizational structure, including entry requirements, the ratio of police to population; the rank structure, the structure of the officer core, the ratio of supervisors to supervised at all levels, the role and function of specialized units, information channels and flow, promotion guidelines and compensation policy;
 - the effectiveness of the management structure generally, with specific focus on rules and regulations that govern the operations and conduct of the High Command, decision-making processes, financial management and control, and impact on organizational behaviour, morale and operational efficiency and integrity;
 - core functions of the JCF, with particular reference to the move towards civilianization and the role of the JCF *vis a vis* other law enforcement and security agencies;
 - the appropriate use of data in the development and implementation of operational strategies;
 - human rights issues related to the appropriate use of force, and the effectiveness of provisions to counter instances of abuse of power and corruption within the JCF;
 - mandate and effectiveness of current oversight and administrative bodies, including the Police Civilian Oversight Agency, the Police Public Complaints Commission, and the Police Services Commission.
5. Engage in consultations with key stakeholders as well as representatives from the general population and relevant international partners and law enforcement agencies;
 6. Assess the effectiveness of current service delivery and develop recommendations to achieve optimal levels of effectiveness and efficiency, particularly with respect to regional accessibility, and changes in population patterns;
 7. Prepare an Action Plan for JCF transformation detailing what changes are required and how to achieve them, implementation timeframe, and indicative resource implications.

The Strategic Review of the JCF has been mandated by the Ministry of National Security, and is being undertaken by a Strategic Review Panel which includes: local and international law enforcement experts; individuals with experience in the management of complex private and public sector organizations, and senior academics with expertise in policing reform.

3. Appendix C - List of persons consulted

<u>Names</u>	<u>Position</u>	<u>Organisation</u>
Rear Admiral Hardley Lewin	Commissioner of Police	Jamaica Constabulary Force
DCP Charles Scarlett	Inspector General	Jamaica Constabulary Force
DCP Jevene Bent	Head of Administration	Jamaica Constabulary Force
DCP Linval Bailey	Head of Operations	Jamaica Constabulary Force
DCP Mark Shields	Head of Crime	Jamaica Constabulary Force
ACP Hinds	Kingsfish	Jamaica Constabulary Force
ACP Novelette Grant	Formerly Head Professional Standards Branch	Jamaica Constabulary Force
ACP John McLean	Head, Community Safety	Jamaica Constabulary Force
ACP Justin Felice	Head Anti-Corruption	Jamaica Constabulary Force
ACP Leon Rose	Community Relations	Jamaica Constabulary Force
ACP Les Green	Major Investigation Task Force	Jamaica Constabulary Force
SSP Ray Palmer	Area 4 Commander	Jamaica Constabulary Force
SSP Watkis	Organised Crime Branch	Jamaica Constabulary Force
Supt. Dennis Watt	St. Mary Division	Jamaica Constabulary Force
Supt. Denver Baker	Formerly Special Anti-Crime Task Force	Jamaica Constabulary Force
Supt. Howard Francis	St. Elizabeth Division	Jamaica Constabulary Force
DSP Lincoln Robinson	Mandeville Division	Jamaica Constabulary Force
Supt. Martin Bailiff	Mandeville Division	Jamaica Constabulary Force
DSP Dermot Lawrence	Hanover Division	Jamaica Constabulary Force
DSP Ford	Flying Squad	Jamaica Constabulary Force
Mr. Marlon Nesbeth	St. Thomas Division	Jamaica Constabulary Force
DSP Dudley Scott	Port Antonio Division	Jamaica Constabulary Force
ACP Karl Williams	Area 5 Commander	Jamaica Constabulary Force
ACP Kingsley Robinson	Area 3 Commander	Jamaica Constabulary Force
ACP Shand	Area 2 Commander	Jamaica Constabulary Force
Mrs. Williams-Martin	Falmouth Division	Jamaica Constabulary Force
SSP Ferguson	Area 1 Commander	Jamaica Constabulary Force
Supt. Steve Mcgreggor	St. James Division	Jamaica Constabulary Force
Mr. Melrose Seivwright	Assistant	Police Public Complaints Authority
Justice Lloyd Ellis	Chairman	Police Public Complaints Authority
Mr Noel Hylton	Chairman	Police Services Commission
Bishop Charles Dufour	Chairman	Police Civilian Oversight Authority
Dr. Lloyd Barnett	Member	Police Services Commission
Mr. Peter Parchment	Director, Strategic Planning	Ministry of Justice

	and Research	
SSP Dormah Harrison	Staff College	JCF Staff College
Dr. Anthony Harriot	Consultant	UWI, Mona
Dr. Carolyn Gomes	Chairman	Jamaicans for Justice
Dr. Peter Phillips	Opposition Spokesman	Parliamentary Opposition
Mr. Harold Crooks	Security Consultant	Jamaica Urban Transit Company
		Partners For Peace, Peace
Mr. Horace Levy	Lecturer	Management Initiative
Mr. Damian Hutchinson	Development Manager	Peace Management Initiative
Ms. Donna Parchment	Chief Executive Officer	Dispute Resolution Foundation
Mr. Paul Hines	Parish Netowrk Manager	Dispute Resolution Foundation
Mrs. Arlene Henry-Hutchinson	Chairperson	Independent Jamaican Council on Human Rights
		Independent Jamaican Council on Human Rights
Ms. Nancy Anderson	Executive Director	Jamaicans for Justice
Mrs. Suzan Goffe	Executive Director	Families Against State Terrorism
Ms. Yvonne Sobers	Director	Police Officers Association
Supt. Norman Heywood	Chairman	Attorney General's Office
Mr. Geoff Madden		Office of the Services Commissions
Ms. Jackie Hinkson	Chief Personnel Officer	
Mr. Arnaldo Brown	Legal Consultant	
Mr. Benthon Hussey	Management Consultant	
Miss Denier Little	Legal Consultant	

4. Appendix D - Summary of Public Consultations

As part of the Review, the Review Panel commissioned a series of Public Consultations which were facilitated by an external facilitator. The consultations were held in 14 different locations around Jamaica in November and December 2007. The consultation sessions involved interactive participation; discussion and feedback was facilitated by the use of presentations, open discussions and small group discussions which were then reported to larger group discussions. To guide the discussions, the facilitator used a list of areas identified for discussion by the Review Panel.

4.1 Top ten issues

Participants were asked to record some of their responses on work sheets. These work sheets were then collected and comments collated for the purpose of this report. The table below shows the top ten issues which emerged from the 14 public consultation sessions.

Ministry of National Security Table A1 : JCF Strategic Review - Top Ten Issues (14 locations)			
RANK	Main Issues	Frequency	Percentage
1	Social Skills	57	7.56%
2	Training & Development	51	6.76%
3	Corruption	38	5.04%
4	Recruitment	37	4.91%
5	Community Policing	35	4.64%
6	Police Conduct/Behaviour	29	3.85%
7	Community Involvement	28	3.71%
8	Public Education	20	2.65%
9	Public Confidence	19	2.52%
10	Investigations	18	2.39%

4.2 Key findings

This section summarises the outcome of group discussions held in all 14 areas where consultations took place.

A total of 17.17% of all comments made by participants at the consultations related to the lack of **social skills** in the police force. This issue had the highest overall frequency of 57. The majority of comments pointed to the need for the police to improve in this area. However, participants did recognise that citizens also needed to improve their interaction with the police. The participants identified social skills as respect, courtesy and communication (both verbal and non verbal). Police personnel were described as often being disrespectful and using provocation and

intimidation in their dealings with the public. Participants felt that this area could be improved through training and development for police staff, particularly in social skills.

Training and development emerged as the second highest area of concern with a high frequency of 51 constituting 6.76% of the total issues documented. Participants felt that the availability and quality of training could be improved; particularly a wider range of training options should be provided including training in interpersonal skills, counselling, better defence and effective crime fighting strategies. There was a belief that an increased focus on improving the overall welfare of police staff would yield a better overall performance, promote professionalism and prepare individuals for promotion.

The next main issue that was identified as of concern by participants was **corruption**. The main areas of corruption mentioned were: (1) bribery; (2) police having illegal buses and taxis on the road; and (3) police not following legal procedures. Participants believed that the prevalence of corruption in the force has resulted in:

- a lack of public confidence;
- poor relationships between the police and citizens;
- a negative perception of the force;
- lack of trust in the justice system;
- citizens being non-supportive.

Participants indicated that there needs to be an increase in measures to eliminate corruption from the JCF. They felt that the process should begin during the recruitment process with proper personnel security vetting checks done for new applicants and recruits to improve the quality of personnel entering the JCF. Comments relating to **recruitment** were raised at a frequency of 37 (4.91% of total comments) and focused mainly on getting the right kind of people to join the JCF; that is, candidates who will have respect for the law, respect for citizens and are the least likely to engage in corruption. Other suggestions to reduce corruption included the establishment of an independent investigative body to investigate corruption in the JCF and the enforcement of strict disciplinary action against those engaging in corrupt practices. In relation to corruption, it was felt that zero tolerance must be exercised.

The next area of concern was that of **community based policing**. Participants felt that community based policing should be implemented across all JCF Areas. Comments related to community policing were at a frequency of 35 and accounted for 4.64% of the total main issues documented. The participants' comments on what they considered community policing related to curfews, patrols, protection of citizens and community resources and knowledge of the community. It was also noted that for effective community policing, the physical conditions of the communities should be conducive to effective policing; in particular zinc fences should be removed, proper street signs put in place, and improvements made to access and exit points. Despite the comments that indicated the citizens' mistrust in the police, participants still felt that the presence of the police in their communities would be beneficial. It is therefore the responsibility of JCF to meet this need and in doing so ensure to rebuild positive relationships with members of the community and ultimately public confidence in the JCF. Rebuilding public confidence was the 9th ranked issue for the participants. The frequency of comment related to this area was 19 or 2.52%.

The JCF must pay careful attention to the **conduct and the behaviour** of its staff if trust and public confidence is to be rebuilt. Police conduct and behaviour was ranked among the top ten issues for all 14 locations, with a frequency rating of 29 and a percentile ranking of 3.85%. This

indicates that the issue demands careful attention from the JCF leadership and management. Comments related to police conduct and behaviour referred largely to the lifestyle of the police officer: activities they engaged in and outside of work hours; their level of professionalism; their compliance to legal procedures; their attitude; and their use of authority.

Community involvement was understandably among the top ten main issues. It received a percentile ranking of 3.71% with a frequency rating of 28. Comments related to community involvement highlighted the need for the police to be involved in community organisations including neighbourhood watch and working with citizens groups on community projects.

Public education received a frequency rating of 20 and a percentile ranking of 2.65%. Participants considered that the public needs to be made more aware of the role they need to play in promoting safe communities, particularly the laws and their rights as citizens.

The quality of **investigations** carried out by the JCF ranked 10th among participants. They felt that there needs to be an improvement in the quality of investigations carried out by police; more time and resources need be invested in training officers in crime scene management and Intelligence and a need for upgraded technology to aid in the investigation process.

5. Appendix E - Summaries of previous reviews

5.1 The Hirst Report

The review of the Jamaica Constabulary Force (JCF) was undertaken at the request of the Minister of National Security in August 1991. The objective of the exercise was to review the JCF in regards to management and organization, the response of the force to increasing levels of crime and violence and their ability to reassure and meet the expectations of the community. Proposals were made to assist the JCF to improve its quality of service, to be effective and efficient and to meet the needs and expectations of the community.

The main findings were as follows:

Management

- There was no evidence of a corporate mission or formal system for determining policies, strategies and objectives. Little or no consideration was given to how services are provided, hence the formation of numerous "Headquarters Squads" and units as a response to problems.
- The absence of a strategy concerning the use of firearms contributed to public perception that the JCF was prepared to use weapons as a first resort.
- There was a proliferation of ranks and a dearth of job descriptions and terms of reference and this caused confusion and duplication of efforts.
- Senior officers were restricted from being effective managers, policy-makers and strategists as a result of a reluctance to delegate responsibility on a day to day basis for operational and administrative matters.
- The existence of numerous squads, based at headquarters to provide services island-wide without reference to territorial managers has lead to an abrogation of responsibility by territorial senior managers for policing in their areas.
- The process of collecting and collating certain categories of information was unstructured and seemed to have had no other defined purpose than to satisfy Ministry of National Security requirements. There was no central point in the JCF to collate, analyze and disseminate statistical information.
- There was no evidence of performance measurement or evaluation as a means of improving the quality of service.

Proposals

- There is a need for the determination of a corporate mission, policies, strategies, objectives and tactics, and a means of evaluating performance. The suggested mission was "To serve, protect and reassure."
- Structures for the formulation and approval of policy and strategy should be established and there should be terms of reference for each of the Headquarters Departments.

- Job descriptions be prepared to facilitate delegation of authority, ensure accountability and improve overall management. A system of collection, analysis and dissemination of management information should be developed.

Organization

- The tendency to create specialized units, not controlled by, or accountable to territorial managers reduced the resources at the local level and detracted from the quality of service provided. Services are provided by the JCF as a response to demands from headquarters, areas, divisions and stations.
- Forty four percent (44%) of the strength of the non-gazette members are concentrated at headquarters, squads, branches, departments and other units, while the “service delivers” (Constables, Acting Corporals and Corporals) made up 40% of current strength.
- The rank structure of 13 separate levels and the concept of gazette and non-gazette officers appear to be exploited for pay and status purposes only and bear little relationship to levels of supervision/responsibility, particularly at the lower ranks.
- There is no justification for the four levels of Superintendents and for the ranks of Corporal and Acting Corporal in terms of their roles and responsibilities.
- The five Deputy Commissioners with discreet responsibilities has led to reluctance to delegate, leaving the Commissioner as the only officer with a complete overview of the force.
- There is duplication and overlap in the roles of the Mobile Reserve Unit and the Special Operations Division.
- The Canine Division concentrates solely on narcotics detection and has no facility for other functions which could assist in combating crime and disorder.
- Headquarters’ CIB units are based in Kingston and it has responded to specific problems by forming specialist squads without clear terms of reference resulting in a blurring of areas of responsibility. When CIB services are provided to territorial divisions, the squads operate independently and autonomously and without reference to territorial command elements.
- The ISCF has a hierarchical structure and in many parts of the island they provide the only police presence on the streets despite being the least well trained element. The JCF and ISCF should be merged to eliminate anomalies in command and levels of training and to improve the standards of service to the community.
- The reliance of the JCF on District Constables for clerical and administrative duties has detracted from their intended role of providing a bridge between the police and community.
- There is an enormous potential for civilianization of posts within the JCF to prevent trained officers from doing administrative duties.
- The Personnel Department only acts as a collation point for information relating to sickness, leave etc, as the allocation of personnel, transfers and promotion are all made without reference to the department. The result is a lack of career development, no identification of training needs and a failure to highlight where there are shortfalls in staff complement to deliver the services needed.

Proposals

- Eighteen divisions should be identified as key service delivery points along with a delegation of authority to Divisional Commanders.
- The status of first line service deliverers should be raised to improve performance and to compensate for the loss of the unnecessary Corporal and Acting Corporal ranks. There should also be a discontinuation of the gazette and non-gazette officers and the adoption of one uniform for all ranks.
- The ISCF should be absorbed into the JCF and District Constables should be retained to perform a specific auxiliary role in local communities.
- There should be a civilianizing of administrative, clerical and support posts currently occupied by police officers.
- To change the image and perception of the JCF, the name "Jamaica Police Service" should be adopted.

Resources

- Difficulties are faced in attracting good quality recruits due to competing demands of commerce and industry, the JDF, and the JCF's poor public image.
- There is a dearth of female recruits and the problem is exacerbated by the lack of suitable accommodation at the Jamaica Police Academy.
- There needs to be an emphasis in recruit training to change the culture and ethos of the organization.
- There is an inefficient utilization of personnel from the Mounted Branch, the Marine Branch and the Force Band. The Mounted Branch clearly has the capacity to undertake operational duties and extra patrols. The Marine Branch carries out similar functions to the JDF and appears not to make a significant contribution to combating crime.
- The majority of the building stock was in a poor state of disrepair with limited accommodation facility for staff. This has a demoralizing effect on the staff and detracts from the image of the force on a whole.
- There is no formal vehicle replacement programme or any specification as to the type of vehicle to be purchased resulting in difficulties in accessing spare parts and repairs and exacerbated by a system that requires all purchases to be done through the Ministries.
- There are no clear processes through which the JCF can identify demands for uniform and equipment. There is no efficient inventory or stock control system.
- The ability of the JCF to conduct surveillance operations or to carry out effective examinations of scenes of crimes is severely limited.
- An extraordinarily high number of telephones, personal radios and facsimile devices were allocated to senior officers, whilst many operational areas and personnel were deprived of even basic equipment.
- The computer section that was formed in 1990 had little evidence of adequate project planning, work schedules, training programmes or implementation plans for projects being

developed and no consideration was given to employ skilled civilians in that area.

Proposals

- To reorganize and revitalize the JCF, a Cadet Training Scheme to incorporate academic and police work experience should be considered. This is intended to provide a bridge between the police and young people.
- Establish a civilian Youth Employment Scheme to provide training for prospective civilian employee.
- Flexible age limit for recruits with measures to improve the recruiting of 'quality' personnel.
- Further improvements to training should include: pre-promotion training, refresher training, skills training (including driving and firearms), management training, and command training.
- A civilian Finance Manager should be appointed to increase the JCF's involvement in the budgetary and financial process.
- There should be improvements for the administration and control of acquisition, storage and issue of equipment to include an inventory and stock control system, a restricted devolution of budgets and a review of weapons needs.

Accountability

- There is no statutory provision to make the JCF accountable to anyone other than the Minister of National Security. There is also no system to enable the Minister to monitor performance or to undertake formal inspections. This makes the Commissioner independent of virtually all checks and balances and leaves the Government open to criticisms that it exercises political influence on the JCF.
- Legislative proposals concerning the creation of an Independent Complaints Authority were widely supported.
- There were disciplinary breaches in relation to possession, storage and handling of firearms and remedial action was not taken even when such matters were brought to senior managers.
- There is reluctance in the JCF to tackle the issue of public relations; as a result the majority of press reporting tends to be of derogatory or critical nature.

Proposals

- Incorporate an inspectorate body, independent of the JCF and responsible to the Minister of National Security and establish a body to represent the community interest or establish three separate bodies based on the three counties.
- Community Consultative Groups for each of the divisions should be established.
- A Lay Visitors Scheme, intended to ensure that arrangements for detention and custody of prisoners are satisfactory should be established.

Service Delivery

- There is a pre-occupation with fighting crime.

- The continued practice of joint armed patrols casts doubt on the ability of the JCF to fulfil their statutory responsibility.
- Forty (40%) percent of available resources were committed to court, escorting prisoners and guard duties and this diminishes the ability of the JCF to effectively combat crime and disorder.
- Crime reporting systems and the information extracted and disseminated were sub-standard. No crime pattern analysis was carried out at divisions or headquarters and intelligence systems were flawed.
- In Divisions, crime was almost exclusively regarded as a matter for CIB officers with a constant abrogation of responsibility by their uniform colleagues, including managers and commanders.
- There were inadequacies in relation to file preparation and submission for prosecution, as files were often late and of poor quality.
- The conditions under which persons detained were held were squalid, unsanitary and generally of inhumane conditions.
- Scope exists for the Community Relations Department to be expanded.
- There were widespread breaches of Force policy with regards to firearms possession and use.
- There were inadequate arrangements, poor equipment and a duplication of effort within the Technical Department and the Forensic Laboratory.

Proposals

- Divisions - In Divisions, Deputy Superintendents should be responsible to Divisional Commander for: operations, crime investigation, traffic policing, community relations and discipline and performance monitoring.
- Foot and mobile patrols should be arranged to provide a visible and conspicuous police presence within communities to afford reassurance to the community.
- Normal crime investigation should be a divisional responsibility.
- There should be supervision of Detective Constables, crime recording, guaranteeing timely and proper file submissions and the appointment of a Divisional collator for collating criminal intelligence.
- A Divisional Community Relations Units should be created with responsibility for crime prevention, promoting community self-help projects and overseeing community consultation arrangements.
- Areas – certain operational support and administration should be provided by the Areas. These are: an Administration Unit, a Crime Administration Unit, a Serious Crime Unit, an Operations Support and Rescue Group and a Traffic Management Unit.
- Headquarters – the Operations Department should be restructured to include Operational Units, a Control Centre and Operations Support.

- The Mounted Branch and Canine Section should be restructured so they can be involved in joint deployment with Operations and Support and Rescue Group.
- The Crime Department at headquarters should provide support and expertise to Divisions to investigate major, serious and organized crime through a major Incident Support Unit, a Serious Crime Unit, a Narcotics Unit and a Fraud Unit.
- There should be a merger of the National Firearms and Drugs Intelligence Unit with the Criminal Intelligence Unit.
- The services of the Scenes of Crime Section and the Forensic Science Laboratory should be improved with training in fingerprint and photographic evidence-gathering, civilianization and a phased transfer of initial scenes of crime investigation to Divisions.
- There should be firmer control, better discipline and overall accountability in the possession, storage and use of firearms.
- Rules of engagement should be reviewed, published and promulgated and there should be immediate administrative and criminal investigations following the discharge of any firearm by an officer.

5.2 Summary of recommendations from the Wolfe Report

The National Task Force on Crime (Wolfe Review) was established in 1991 to advise the GOJ on appropriate strategies for the maintenance of law and order in Jamaica and to make specific recommendations in regards 'to the prevailing levels of crime and violence, the deleterious effect of crime on the social order and its negative potential for economic development'. The review set out what the review team considered to be the main causes of crime and violence in Jamaica and made a series of recommendations for reform. In relation to the JCF, these were:

- Provide a stronger police presence in the parishes of Kingston, St. Andrew, St. Catherine, and St. James, while strengthening the Crime Stop Programme, supporting and expanding the Neighbourhood Watch Programme as well as improving the Witness Protection Programme;
- Recognize, investigate and deal with the relationship between white collar or middle class criminal activities and lower class street crime in the areas of narcotics trade, distribution and export.
- Control the availability and circulation of firearms through efficient security of the coast line and ports of entry. The necessary equipment, transportation and support services for effective policing must be provided. The focus of the police must be on crime prevention rather than crime solution.
- The Criminal Intelligence Unit in the JCF is isolated with sub-standard networking, little influence on the investigating effort and hardly relied on by investigators, with a weak flow of intelligence to the unit. It needs to be reorganized with more staff, more equipment and transportation being trained in analyzing intelligence.
- The "Security Forces" need to undergo restructuring in order to make them more efficient, effective and professional in service delivery. The role of the ISCF and possible merger with the JCF needs to be re-examined.
- The JCF should be transformed from a Para-military organization into a civil organization with

the Mobile Reserve Unit being developed into a strong Para military unit for the purpose of suppressing crime and civil disorder.

- There is a need for a more permanent police presence in volatile communities in the Corporate Area so as to promote public confidence in the police's ability to protect residents.
- A down-sized JDF of regular personnel sufficiently large to be an immediate action force should be maintained to deal with any emergency situation until the Reserve elements can be mobilized.
- The maintenance of a Para-military and barracked Mobile Reserve be undertaken, to be used to assist the police in crime suppression, and suitably sized units of this Mobile Reserve should be barracked in the central and eastern parishes for easy deployment.
- Early steps be taken to release more personnel to perform preventive patrols in a more targeted manner to prevent crime and maintain order in our streets and public places, and to be a source of much needed intelligence.
- More sophisticated predictive techniques to permit timelier police action aimed at early suppression of the usual flare up in gun and related violent crimes should be employed.
- The recruitment and appointment of sufficient persons with proven reputation, character and calibre to advise the management of the JCF, and with the appropriate authority to propose changes in the system as recommended by this Task Force and the Hirst Report.
- The curriculum of senior courses at the college should include subjects such as police operation analysis, elementary statistical analysis, comparative police systems, and certain themes in the Use of English. There should be improved training programmes for Assistant Commissioner and Senior Superintendent and refresher and specialist training programmes should be restructured and expanded to improve the skills and attitudes of line staff.
- History, Psychology, Sociology and English should occupy at least ten percent (10%) of syllabus hours instead of the current 6.1 percent; and that community relations occupy at least 5 percent instead of the current 0.83 percent.
- The accelerated promotion examination and course should become a permanent feature of the annual promotion exercises in the JCF and should be the point for direct entry into the JCF. Direct entrants should possess matriculation requirements for UWI and should have completed the basic recruit training courses at the Academy.
- The JCF should immediately take steps to design career paths to encourage the retention of promoted personnel in the operations field while allowing for the development of talent in administration. Presently operations personnel at the supervisory levels are moved into administrative positions far too early in their careers.
- The National Firearm and Drug Intelligence Centre should be converted into a National Intelligence Coordinating Centre with internal units for Firearm and Drugs, Currency, Terrorism and Organized Crime. A national intelligence collator system should be developed by the Criminal Intelligence Unit.
- A uniform crime reporting system and a statistical unit should be established along the lines recommended in the Pritchett Report with the necessary adjustments in keeping with more recent developments.
- Immediate steps should be taken to develop pilot projects in one urban and one rural

division, not only to introduce a uniform crime reporting system but to modernize information processing in the general offices of Divisional and possibly one Area Headquarters.

- The name of the JCF should be changed to the "Jamaica Constabulary Service" and its ultimate aim should be to create a Civil Police Service to focus on crime prevention, law enforcement and crowd and traffic control.
- Section 3(2) of the Constabulary Force Act which states: " Subject to the provisions of subsection (3) the Force shall consist of . . . (a) "a Commissioner who, subject to the orders of the Minister, shall have the sole command and superintendence of the Force, should be amended to make it clear that the day-to-day operations of the Force are the sole province of the Commissioner and that the Minister should be restricted to the making of policies.
- The appointment of the Police Service Commission should be removed from the political directorate and be appointed by the Governor General at his sole discretion.
- The Commissioner should be appointed by the Governor General, on the recommendation of an Independent Police Service Commission, without being required to consult with any other body or person; and given security of tenure, liable to be dismissed only for misbehaviour, or for inability to discharge the functions of the office.
- The Commissioner of Police must be empowered to transfer or dismiss any member of the force, including members of gazette ranks, subject to a right of appeal to the Police Services Commission by the aggrieved person.
- Promotions for all ranks up to Superintendent should be based on the passing of examinations and annual appraisal reports.
- Any member of the Security Force found to be actively involved in partisan politics should be immediately dismissed and members should be encouraged to report any attempts by politicians or anyone to interfere with them in the execution of their duty with a view to having the allegation investigated by Public Complaints Authority.
- Assignments of security officers to politicians should be for a period not exceeding two years.
- The appointment of Police Community Social Workers. After graduating from basic recruit training, an optional module should be offered to probationary constables to be trained as Police-Community Welfare Officers.
- A Public Relations Programme must be commenced and spearheaded by Senior Officers of the force, the MNS and the Jamaica Information Service to emphasize the positives to be gained in having the community and the police working together and the role that the public is expected to play.
- Members of Parliament must sensitize their constituents as to the role of the police and the role of the community in the fight against crime to bring home the idea of partnership or shared responsibility.
- The role of the police as "providing a service" should be emphasized through the visiting of schools and educating the children in the role and function of the police.
- Steps should be taken to ensure that the training of police includes the rights and protection of citizens. The image of the police should be changed from that of the oppressor to that of Peace Officer and Protector of the citizen.

- Community policing must be re-introduced where members of the Police force are equipped to respond effectively to reports made by citizens. More extensive use should be made of Police/Community Organizations such as Neighbourhood Watch, Youth Clubs. Smaller communities could establish District Watches.
- The District Constable, originally the symbol of police involvement in the community, must be returned to all parishes to assist in reforming the link between police and community. Citizens should assume responsibility for improving the welfare of the Police in their parish or community through the establishment of consultative committees.
- A Police Ambulance Service should be developed as an adjunct to the usual Hospital Ambulance and which would be able to respond to all requests to 119 staffed by uniformed policemen who are qualified First Aiders. All police stations should be designated St. John's Ambulance First Aid post.
- All members of the Force should be required to develop a personal community relations programme in an approved format, the success of which would also count towards promotion.
- The Suppression of Crime Act should be repealed immediately.
- New recruits must be supervised by a Senior Officer in the performance of their duties and only in exceptional circumstances should off-duty policemen be allowed to carry weapons.
- Police officers found guilty of abuse of citizens, whether in a Court of Criminal or Civil Jurisdiction, should be liable to pay a substantial portion of the compensation without the need for the citizen to seek redress by civil litigation.
- The statutory period of limitation for commencing an action against the Attorney General in cases of abuse by the police should be enlarged and the proceeds of a judgment against the Attorney General should be recoverable by execution.
- The Independent Board established to hear complaints against members of the security forces must be enabled to function efficiently by being adequately staffed. The Board should be required to issue reports, on its investigations on a quarterly basis and police officers adjudged liable of frequent abuse should be dismissed.
- The quality of recruits must be improved both academically and as to character. Every applicant should undergo psychological and psychiatric tests to ascertain his or her mental suitability for the job.
- Officers should also undergo a briefing and debriefing session before and after each tour of duty or after each operation, through a proposed strengthened Counselling Services.
- During the period of training the importance of integrity should be stressed to all trainees and trainees should be closely monitored to discover any integrity problem.
- Corruption allegations should be investigated by a body outside of the Force such as the Police Public Complaint Authority. Proof of corruption on the part of any member should result in summary dismissal. An internal affairs branch should be set up to monitor the conduct of JCF personnel.
- Engagement in any other form of occupation that is in conflict with the duties of a policeman must be prohibited.

- Weapons and ammunitions issued must be accounted for at the end of each tour of duty, and also the entire stock of weapon and ammunition at each police station should be physically checked off each day. Every single round of ammunition should be accounted for even if discharged for a legitimate reason.
- A system of regular job rotation with proper hand over/take over by reliever and relieved should immediately be put in place.
- Direct entry into the Force at Officer Level is a must. This is necessary to infuse a new culture into the organization as well as to recruit persons with a high level
- Persons who are just biding their time awaiting retirement age, mere passengers, and proven undesirables should be retired in the public interest as their presence in the organization can only serve to further damage the morale of the organization.
- There should be continuous training at all levels of the organization. Upgrading the skills of the personnel will help to motivate and create a new image of the organization.
- The JCF Code of Conduct and the United Nations Code of Conduct for Law Enforcement Officials should be strictly enforced.
- The present dehumanizing conditions in Police Barracks should be considerably improved
- The Consultative Committees should perform the role of watchdogs of Police conduct in the community and report unbecoming conduct to the Divisional Officer, the Public Service Commission or the Public Complaints Authority.
- In addition to the proposed anti-corruption unit in the J.C.F., a regime should be designed to aid the effective suppression of police corruption. The police must be required, under the JCF Act to complete income tax returns and declaration of assets annually and submit them to the Commissioner before transmission to the relevant authority.
- The anti-corruption staff should be attached to all Divisional Headquarters and should work in a proactive manner. It is recommended that regulations be enacted under Section 6 of the Police Public Complaint Authority Act 1992 empowering the authority to investigate or supervise the investigation of alleged police corruption and that allegations of police corruption be clearly included as part of the mischief which the Act seeks to regulate.
- The UWI and CAST (now UTech) should be approached and asked to develop a degree programme in police science and administration which would assist in preparing the management cadre of the JCF.
- The rank structure of the JCF should be altered to create economies and improve efficiencies.

5.3 Summary of recommendations from the KPMG/DFID report

Below is a summary of the KPMG/DFID Review of the JCF. The Review formed part of a larger review of the Ministry of National Security and focused on clarifying the purpose and strategic objectives of the JCF in the context of the Government's priorities and ensuring that available resources were targeted on core functions and critical areas of necessary public expenditure. The review was intended to help the Ministry to identify the main functions of the JCF and the key issues to be addressed in order to secure performance improvement.

The mission and objectives of the JCF

The initial stage in the strategic review process is to understand the mission and strategic objectives of the JCF. The current mission and objectives of the JCF are new and were set by the JCF during the reviews undertaken by Hirst and the Crown Agents in 1991 and 1997 respectively. It is:

The mission of the Jamaica Constabulary Force and its auxiliaries is to serve, protect and reassure the people of Jamaica through the delivery of impartial and professional services aimed at:

- maintenance of law and order;
- protection of life and property;
- prevention and detection of crime; and
- preservation of the peace.

'We serve, we protect, we reassure, with courtesy, integrity and proper respect for the rights of all.'

The Commissioner of Police and his senior officers are committed to this mission and its realisation.

The objectives of the JCF

The recently approved objectives of the JCF which form the basis of its Corporate Strategy are:

- To manage crime by improving our investigative capabilities, implementing crime prevention measures and increasing crime detection.
- To manage traffic in order to reduce congestion and also reduce fatal accidents.
- To develop community policing with the aim of re-establishing closer partnership with communities.
- To develop a more professional police force for the delivery of service wherein the citizens of Jamaica will enjoy safety and security.
- To provide an improved service, protection and assurance to the people of Jamaica through a JCF which is structured and managed effectively and efficiently.
- To ensure effectiveness, efficiency and economy in the acquisition, allocation, use and maintenance of our financial and material resources.
- To develop a service oriented Force with standards of performance guided by ethics.

Given that these objectives have only recently been determined, and that they command the full endorsement of the Commissioner and his senior officers, we agreed with the JCF that our review would proceed on the basis of the above objectives.

Performance Indicators and Assessment of Performance

We helped the JCF to develop strategic performance indicators such as:

- % reduction in the incidence of murder by year 2003
- % reduction in the incidence of major crime by year 2003
- % increase in the detection of white collar crime over previous year
- % increase in marijuana eradication over previous year
- % number of convictions against total prosecutions per year
- % reduction of accidents over previous year
- % of community satisfied with the level of foot and mobile patrols
- number of commendations received by the JCF from members of the community against previous year
- ratio of police personnel per crime
- ratio of police personnel per capita of population
- average cost of policing per capita of population compared with the previous year
- % of public expenditure spent on policing against previous years
- % reduction in disciplinary charges against members of the JCF against the previous year
- number of complaints substantiated against police personnel against the previous year
- % of community satisfied with response to 119 calls

We were asked to assess the performance of the JCF against these key indicators. A full assessment was not possible as some of the indicators are new and thus little or no data has been collected against them. Where targets have not been set, we have recommended that this is done before the 1999/2000 year. We have made recommendations for improvement in this area.

The information we were able to obtain on crime rates (January to mid December 1998) showed that the JCF had progressively improved its overall clear up rate in most parishes. The areas of concern remain Kingston, and the surrounding areas such as St Andrew and St Thomas, where the detection rates remain low. This is due to the high level of crime and the difficulties the police face in operating in these areas:

Prior Options

We were asked to identify functions performed by the JCF which did not contribute to its core strategic objectives and should therefore be abolished, transferred to another part of government, or to the private sector.

Lower priority Functions

Remand Prisoners

We consider that there is potential for the JCF to get better utilisation from its current resources through re-deployment and re-focusing of personnel on to core policing activities. In this context

we identified that the care and control of remand prisoners is diverting valuable resources away from the current objectives of the JCF and that divestment of this function would make a significant contribution to the JCF's overall effectiveness and capability. We have recommended a number of actions to be taken in the courts system which, in the long term, will reduce the number of prisoners on remand and that the care and control of the remaining remand prisoners should be contracted out to the private sector. In the short term we have recommended that Correctional Services take over the Kingston Remand Centre.

Immigration

We support the recommendations put forward by the Management Development Division of the Cabinet Office, and recently endorsed by Cabinet, that Immigration and Passport control should be divested from the JCF and that a new immigration and passport agency should be established under the MNSJ. This recommendation will allow over 150 police personnel to be re-deployed to core duties.

Overlap and duplication

We identified a number of areas in the JCF where we believe there is overlap and duplication of activities. These are:

- the responsibilities of specialist units;
- Marine Division and the JDF;
- Protective Services and Special Branch; and
- Internal Affairs and Complaints.

We have made recommendations for these duplications to be remedied. In the case of the specialist units and the Protective Services and Special Branch, we have recommended a rationalisation of responsibilities. For the Marine Division, which is severely depleted in resources, we have recommended a merger with Ports Division and that the new combined Ports/Marine Division is decentralised. In the case of Internal Affairs and Complaints, we have recommended a merger of the two units and decentralisation.

Contracting Out

The following functions were identified as being appropriate for contracting out:

- transportation of prisoners;
- transport and repairs;
- building cleaning and maintenance.

We believe that the transporting of prisoners to and from court and prison significantly impacts on the availability of police personnel for core duties and that it should be divested to the private sector. Transport and Repairs currently contracts with over 40 individual contractors and we believe that greater value for money could be delivered if the service was contracted with one large company. This would also remove the necessity for purchase and warehousing of spare parts. The standard of cleaning and property maintenance by civilian staff in the JCF is variable. A better quality service could be obtained through the private sector.

Agencies

During this review, we identified three candidates for agency status which are currently the responsibility of the JCF. These are:

- the Staff College and Police Academy;
- Forensic Laboratory;
- NFDIC.

Agency status will help these organisations to deliver greater efficiency and effectiveness through the management of their budgets and resources and the ability to generate funds where possible. In the merger of the Staff College and the Police Academy we envisage the creation of a new college for security and justice which could also eventually incorporate Correctional Services and criminal justice training.

Constraints on Performance

Planning and Performance Measurement

There have been great improvements in strategic planning in the JCF since the implementation of the Corporate Strategy which has established the production of strategic and divisional policing plans and an annual report. Nonetheless there is less linkage between corporate planning in the JCF and the corporate planning of the MNSJ than desirable. We have recommended that a regular meeting is held comprising the Minister and the heads of each Department of the MNSJ and that the corporate planning process in the JCF be more closely aligned to that of the MNSJ.

Performance information collected in the JCF is not comprehensive and does not relate directly to the objectives of the organisation. We believe that there is room for improvement and have made recommendations for a more comprehensive performance measurement system to be put in place. Analysis of the information is the responsibility of the Research and Planning Division. This Division has been under-staffed for some time and unable to provide the Commissioner with the management and performance information he requires. We have recommended a new structure for this Division.

Inspection

The monitoring of performance in the JCF is the responsibility of the Inspection Branch. The Inspection Branch's strength is currently depleted and for some time it has been unable to undertake the full range of its responsibilities, 'inspections' are less 'in-depth' and less frequent than the top management would like. It suffers from a poor image in the JCF which further hinders its performance. We believe that this area is crucial to the delivery of effective performance in the JCF and that the Branch should be reorganised and decentralised to encourage a partnership approach to performance monitoring and improvement and a more frequent inspection process. Able junior member of the JCF should be posted to Inspection Branch to improve its image and bring fresh ideas.

Finance

The JCF does not have delegated budgetary responsibility. We believe that greater efficiency and effectiveness could be obtained if the JCF took over responsibility for its budget in the long term. We envisage a three year progressive hand over of responsibility. This will commence with the establishment of a finance unit in the JCF and education and training for personnel who

will need to become competent in financial management and accounting. Any delegation of responsibility would need to be accompanied by an effective audit function within the JCF and at MNSJ level.

The JCF's operations are severely hindered by the intermittent cash flow from the Ministry of Finance which means that suppliers are not paid on time and, occasionally, not at all. This is creating acute shortages of equipment in some areas of the JCF as suppliers are not prepared to do business with the JCF. The problem is compounded by the lack of influence the JCF has in deciding its expenditure priorities.

Resource Allocation

The Corporate Strategy highlights the importance of visible and accessible policing through increased foot and mobile patrolling and an increasing emphasis on working closely with the Jamaican people on crime prevention. This strategy is dependent on the availability of manpower. We were told that there were acute shortages of manpower and that the JCF needed to increase in size. However, we believe that there are problems with human resource allocation and availability which, if addressed, would increase significantly the total number of police hours available to the JCF and ensure that police personnel are located in the areas where they are most needed. If these issues are addressed, we consider that the JCF is likely to be able to re-deploy between 1000-1500 police personnel to enable it to meet its targets and objectives: Recruitment of additional personnel with its consequent impact on the recurrent budget, may not be necessary, and should not proceed until the effect of re-deployment has been assessed. The issues to be addressed are:

- a rationalisation of police stations to reduce:
- anomalies between the location of stations relative to population and crime levels;
- the number of small rural police stations where a proportion of personnel are on static duties in stations rather than flexibly deployed in the community;
- a reduction in the number of personnel involved in non core activities who could be re-deployed more effectively. These include personnel who:
 - o transport prisoners;
 - o guard courts;
 - o spend inordinate amounts of time in court because of the frequent adjournment of cases and the listing system;
 - o provide guard duties for other government departments;
 - o guard remand prisoners;
 - o police personnel who are involved in work which could be performed by civilians;
- the imbalance between the number of personnel in headquarters units and those in the geographical Divisions.

Vehicles

The JCF suffers from an acute lack of vehicles caused by the bulk purchase of vehicles in 1994, of which most are going out of service at the same time, and cash flow problems which have

prevented the purchase of spare parts for regular servicing and repair of vehicles. This situation is severely compromising the JCF's ability to deliver an effective policing service. We have recommended that two options are considered following a rationalisation of the current fleet: leasing of vehicles; or a staggered approach to vehicle purchase and management. The first option will mean that the Transport and Repairs Division could be significantly reduced while the second presents options for contracting out repairs and servicing.

Personnel

The personnel functions in the JCF are separated between Civilian Personnel which deals with the personnel needs of all civilians and, because of their status as civil servants, all gazetted officers, and Establishments which deals with all other ranks. A recent MDD report on the personnel departments in the JCF suggested that these two merge. We support this recommendation.

Intelligence

Intelligence is gathered in many specialist units in the JCF. There are several areas of concern regarding the production, collation and dissemination of intelligence and relations with other intelligence gathering organisations, which were of concern to the review team. We also believe that there is insufficient assessed intelligence available to the Minister and MNSJ to help inform their decisions on resource allocation. We have made recommendations for a full review of intelligence activity in Jamaica.

Structure of the JCF, staffing and savings

The JCF is already undergoing a major programme of change through its Corporate Strategy which has at its root the need for the organisation to modernise to deliver service oriented and pro-active policing. There is, as part of this programme, a group considering the shape and size of the organisation. Therefore, although we have set out many recommendations in this review which will change the shape and size of the JCF we have not suggested a definitive structure. This will be produced in due course by the above group.

Staffing

The current JCF establishment is 7,500 against which it has some 6,800 personnel plus a cadre of trainees. The Government of Jamaica (GoJ) has agreed to increase the establishment to 8,500. In this report we have set out a number of recommendations which will assist the JCF to achieve optimum resource deployment and more man hours from its existing personnel. Rather than increasing the number of police personnel, we propose that the redeployment and higher civilianisation recommendations in our review should be implemented before further consideration is given to increasing the current head count and that the JCF should operate within a manpower ceiling of 7,000. This would avoid the recruitment of an additional 1,500 personnel in the near term.

There are just under 800 civilian staff posts in the JCF, plus a handful of casual workers employed on short contracts. Most of these staff are clerical or manual workers who support the JCF in managing their buildings, offices and installations. We have identified further areas where civilianisation is appropriate. Any programme of civilianisation will inevitably raise the number of civilian staff in the JCF. However, we believe that the number of trained police personnel who will be released for other core policing duties more than merits such an investment. We recommend that the JCF should be allowed to recruit to the limit of its civilian establishment.

The JCF is supported by the Island Special Constabulary Force (ISCF) which is the reserve force and District Constables who are drawn from and work with the JCF in their own parishes. There

are just over 1000 Special Constables and around 1500 District Constables. The ISCF has recently been reviewed and there is an ongoing programme to reduce its size and return it to a true reserve force. Neither District Constables nor ISCF personnel have as much responsibility in policing as the regular force and are mainly deployed in guarding buildings, beat, static traffic patrol and manning police stations.

5.4 Recommendations from the PERF Review

Police Executive Research Forum (PERF)

Violent Crime and Murder Reduction in Kingston

Background

The PERF team undertook an evaluation of violent crime and murders in Kingston with the aim of developing strategies for reducing violence. Situating the JCF in the context of its main partners - the courts, corrections and the community, the study also examined related issues such as: investigative capacity and techniques; measures in place to prevent violence; how crimes are prosecuted; detention and incarceration issues; how the JCF collects information and conducts analyses; how the JCF is deployed and conducts operations; how the JCF is perceived by the public; how the JCF regulates itself; how the public can play a role in the reduction of violence; and the flow of guns and deported persons. Recommendations are directed at: reducing murders and other violent crimes in Kingston Metropolitan Area; developing operational strategies and deployment practices; procedures and activities that influence relationships; enhancing community perceptions, and improving the effectiveness of the criminal justice system.

Key Findings and Recommendations

Deployment and Operations

- The JCF is operating below its authorised strength, resulting in an insufficient deployment of constables in local areas.
- The JCF and most of the criminal justice system's approach is largely reactive, and based on separate events rather than how incidents form patterns
- Routine deployment of constables from different units in the same geographical location, with different focus and objectives and operating on different radio frequencies, represent opportunities for conflicting operations and uncertain constable safety.

Recommendations

- The Special Anti-Crime Squad should be restructured into a smaller tactical response team. The JCF currently lacks a well-trained response unit for hostage rescue, high-risk entry, and crisis negotiation.
- Uniformed units patrolling in a specific area, regardless of their assignment, should be operating on the radio frequency for that geographic area.
- Patrol vehicles should not routinely be deployed with more than two constables in them.
- The practice of joint JCF and JDF patrol should cease.

- Employ high risk teams as guided by policy and training.
- The Commissioner should select one station, perhaps in St. Andrew South where the murder and shooting rates are higher than any other location, and create a model station.
- Officers should be distributed to shifts in accordance with workload. Geographic deployment should be based on the actual crime experience and where problems are known to exist.
- Examine deployment issues with more comprehensive information linking crime data, radio control room information, and minor crime information.
- The Mobile Reserve and Motorized Patrol components should be eliminated and their personnel reassigned to local station patrol duty.
- The geographical area of each station should be subdivided into manageable "beats" with clearly defined boundaries.
- The "Crimestop" program is not well promoted within the JCF and the general belief of the program needs to be promoted the extensively
- Discontinue the current practice of bypassing a station commander, who needs to be familiar with the local area in order to fully develop strategies and plans to meet local objectives.
- The directed patrol list ("Hot Spots") is a good concept. Each area commander should work with individual station commanders in determining where local problems are and how they should be addressed. Once responsibility for crime (and solutions) is pushed down, the COMPSTAT Model then is an excellent tool to permit top administrators to randomly, but regularly, evaluate the effectiveness of their commanders.

Community Policing and Crime Prevention

Both community policing and crime prevention initiatives are viewed as programs rather than central to crime control. While the JCF recognises the benefits of community policing and involvement in crime prevention initiatives, measures to deal with the increasing level of violence limits the Force's ability to focus on making progress in community policing and crime prevention.

- Overlapping deployment blurs the concept of community policing wherein the assigned constable is recognised as that "community's" representative
- The high level of violence and overall lack of respect leave many constables fearing for their safety. As a result, constables in some areas did not take the time to engage the community and develop the personal relationships important to community policing

Recommendations

- Community policing should be the central theme of the JCF's crime prevention and control strategy.
- The JCF should work with school authorities to put in place a vigorous violence reduction curriculum that includes discussion of alternative dispute resolution as well as the specific problem of guns
- Community policing needs to become a reality, this should involve the following: active

use of the community policing work plan; commitment at all levels of the agency; information and analysis upon which to build strategies; free-flowing communication; empowered personnel; an engaged community and accountability.

- The following mechanism should be put in place to ensure accountability: Community Based Policing Project Board meetings should be attended by both station commanders and lower-level personnel; annual Policing Plan reports and updates should require a full progress report on all community policing successes and failures; broaden the base of individuals involved in the community policing process to include residents, business people, schools, elected and appointed officials and faith based organizations; crime prevention initiatives and community policing effort needs to be measured qualitatively and quantitatively
- Establish parish development committees for coordinating the planning, implementing and monitoring processes of public service delivery at the parish level.
- The JCF should vigorously promote crime prevention initiatives as part of its community policing plan, this should include developing a wide net approach for getting crime prevention program information to the media – in newspapers, JCF printed material, radio stations, TV stations, posters, internet, billboards, public transportation and on fliers distributed at sidewalk markets.
- As part of its every day operating philosophy, the JCF should build crime prevention initiatives into calls for police service, that is, constables should reinforce the message of crime prevention when crime reports are taken. When a serious unsolved crime takes place or a crime trend is identified within a community, constables need to accurately and quickly inform the citizens in his beat that the JCF needs their help in solving crimes and keeping their neighbourhood safe.

Equipment and Facilities

- Significant deficiency in equipment. The JCF is short on vehicles for patrol and side arms for constables deployed in the field. In addition, specialised equipment for evidence collection and processing is nonexistent.

Recommendations

- The requirements of morgue transport services, morgue facilities, and medical examiners should be upgraded to maximize the availability and use of evidence in the solution of murders and the conviction of the accused.
- Equipment needs to be in sufficient supply for units engaged in high-risk operations
- Facilities (private rooms) must be provided for the interview of witnesses and the interrogation of suspects.

Human Resources, Training and Organisation

- Significant deficiency in training. While documentary evidence points to attendance at specialised training classes, there is no routine in-service training schedule to ensure all constables are up to date in professional developments, legal changes, new techniques, firearms re-qualification, and constable safety issues.

Recommendations

- The JCF should consider expanding the practice of employing disciplinary action when police wrongdoing is confirmed but criminal action is inappropriate; greater use should be made of the Commissioner's right to refuse the re-enlistment of members with recurring problems.
- Consolidate the Bureau of Special Investigations, the Office of Professional Responsibility, Internal Affairs, and Complaints.
- The JCF should initiate a close staffing review of personnel assignments throughout the agency. Civilianize of some sworn positions.
- A single tracking system to identify problem members should be developed as an "Early Warning System".
- The JCF should publish regular statistics about fatal police shootings, wounding, accidental shootings and subsequent criminal or disciplinary actions.
- Police shooting incidents should be reviewed for training potential by an internal shooting review board.
- Discontinue the Police Complaints Authority.
- The Commissioner must develop and impart a sense of urgency about the changes that must be made within the JCF.
- How to promote and reinforce crime prevention activities verbally should be taught at the Academy and in-service training
- Constables, supervisors and managers assigned to specialized units must receive specialized training.

Information Management and Crime Analysis

- Difficulty in coordinating many enforcement efforts and slow/incomplete analysis of crime data. The level of computerisation does not support useful crime analysis.
- Although a great deal of information is collected by the JCF and transmitted between commanders, field commanders, constables and investigators do not use much of it in meaningful crime analysis.
- The sharing of information is somewhat restricted to the top of the organization, not filtering to the street level
- Response to crime is based on the Commissioner's weekly crime strategy meetings, which focuses on information sharing and the development of strategies.

Recommendations

- Positive steps toward the coordination of the information and intelligence.
- Patrol constables should generate intelligence reports relative to their day-to-day street contacts.
- Track additional information about gun recoveries.

- Timely reporting of accurate information: crime mapping - locations, times, motives, suspects, vehicles if used, similarities among crimes, and more must be made available to station commanders while the information has meaning
- Better communication of crime analysis information to the front-line staff Constables and supervisors are currently deployed to problem areas constables need to better understand problems, who is causing them, which conditions - if changed – might impact the problem, which other governmental agency might be able to assist
- Better coordination among the units conducting analysis or collecting statistics
- Utilize electronic transfers of information from one analytical area to another.
- Begin developing relational databases to reduce duplication of data entry functions.

Criminal Investigations and Murder

- Investigations of murders and non-fatal shootings are conducted either by the centralised homicide component or by local investigators.
- Investigations are hampered by a lack of crime scene management, incomplete evidence collection, poor post mortem examinations, inoperable forensics and ballistics equipment, and the absence of an automated fingerprint identification and wanted persons systems
- Investigators are legally prevented from conducting wiretaps and post-arrest processing (fingerprinting and photographing) of accused persons
- The closure rate for homicide is uncertain, reports vary from 42 to 54 per cent
- The profile of murders show: most victims tend to be males between the ages of 16 and 40 years old; incidents take place outdoors usually with a firearm; more than half of murder victims die on the way to hospital; domestic violence and reprisals account for 26% and 39% of murders in the Kingston Metropolitan Area (KMA).
- In recognition of the links between violence drugs and organised crime, the JCF has directed resources at collecting information on gang related activities and 'Dons' and has created specialised units to deal thwart associated criminal enterprises. However, much of this is directed at lower-level gangs and information is not shared in a coordinated way to meet common objectives

Recommendations

- Centralize the homicide unit to handle all homicide investigations in KMA and create two other satellite homicide units of 9 investigators each, strategically placed at the further reaches of Jamaica. This would eliminate the responsibility of homicide investigations from the divisions, enabling the development of the "homicide team" approach to prompt focus on critical leads.
- Combine the Fingerprint and Photography Units into a single Evidence Collection Unit. Use colour photography in murder investigations
- Procure an automated fingerprint identification system.
- Utilize the capabilities of the department's Forensic Laboratory

- The Drug Fire system should be fixed or replaced and linked to other systems in the Caribbean and the United States.
- Patrol constables must preserve and control homicide scenes, by establishing a perimeter, safeguard against contamination, detain potential witnesses, and begin preliminary investigations. This requires additional training for existing constables.
- Homicide investigations should be subject to regular review by means of a good case management system
- Develop an island-wide wanted and records check system as a matter of priority

JCF and the Criminal Justice System

- The overall system of justice that the police depend upon for support is broken. The police, prosecutors, judges and probation officers work independently of each other.
- Prosecutors do not get involve in murder and violent assault cases until investigations are nearly completed. Successful prosecutions depend on the willingness of witnesses to come forward.
- The Witness Protection Administration Unit is understaffed, this undermines the safety of witnesses and the ability to find cooperative witnesses
- Cases are often delayed for considerable time in the Courts resulting in an enormous backlog. The courts system does no rely on plea bargaining and alternative dispute resolution methods to help reduce caseloads.

Recommendations

- Create and implement a Criminal Justice Coordinating Council to open a dialogue and improve communication between the various agencies involved in public safety. This group should be comprised of representatives from the police, the court system, corrections, parole and probation, legal aid, prosecutors, health and mental health.
- A senior prosecutor from the Public prosecutors Office should be available to respond to the scene of any homicide to provide legal and investigative advice to the police
- The most experienced prosecutors should work with the JCF's investigative unit managers and training officials to develop courses for investigative personnel geared to better case development and element necessary for successful prosecution.

JCF and the Department of Corrections

- Accused persons may remain in detention for a considerable amount of time, during which there are not offered work details or skills/educational programs.
- Nearly 4000 sentenced prisoners are housed in 11 facilities, where conditions are dismal, the application of basic security measures is inconsistent, there is little use of technology, corruption is rife, drugs and criminal activities are not uncommon, and little priority is given to extracting information about unsolved crimes from the inmate population.

Recommendations

- Prisoners should not be taken into custody without fingerprints and photographs being

taken.

- Corruption within the detention system must be addressed.
- Inmates should be afforded programs aimed at re-entry. Teaching these inmates any skill provide basic schooling
- To lessen overcrowding in pre-trial detention facilities, explore procuring and using Radio Frequency bracelets on re-trial, parolees and probationers for home detention
- Headcounts should ideally take place whenever shifts change - or at a minimum, daily, including random and unannounced shakedowns random.
- Shift the responsibility for community supervision to parole and probation officers.
- Corruption within the detention system must be addressed. The DCS should establish an internal affairs component to ensure its employees comply with policies and that legitimate complaints are dealt with thoroughly
- Assign a team of seasoned investigators to an intelligence unit to work the various pre-trial and prison facilities. Their goal should be to develop inmate sources of information useful to the investigation of crimes, the drug trade and organised crime.

Other Recommendations

- A high level, broad based leadership- task force that has credibility with the political and criminal justice leadership of Jamaica should be convened.
- Develop and invest in a nationwide parenting program and public relations campaign that focuses on successful parenting of young children, to age six.

Strategies for Moving Forward

1. Moving From a Reactive/Centralized Model to a Proactive/Decentralized Model

The JCF and most of the criminal justice system's approach to crime appears to be largely reactive. Constables respond to 119 calls or are deployed to so-called hot spots and reports are taken. Constables and citizens, alike, feel a sense of hopelessness as the police response is always reactionary and based on separate events rather than how incidents form patterns that need to be interrupted. What is needed is a dramatic shift in how crime is viewed.

Analysis should focus on geographic areas, and the commander of each local area should be held responsible for the development and implementation of effective crime reduction methods rather than simply making arrests after the fact. Station commanders need to be held responsible for mapping crime on a daily basis, detecting patterns, analyzing relationships between offenders and victims, and linking crimes together rather than viewing them as separate events. Repeat calls, repeat offenders, and repeat locations need to be analyzed. Rather than just deploying units to hot spot locations, commanders need to engage in problem solving to develop proactive strategies that impact crime. The station commander needs to be viewed as the most significant manager in the organization who will be held responsible for understanding the nature of crime in his or her location and developing strategies that will reduce crime. It is far more important to reduce crime in the first place than to make an arrest that will only take years to resolve.

Resources need to be reallocated to give station commanders the maximum number of

constables in order to effectively reduce crime. Rather than having numerous specialized units it would be better to provide station commanders with additional resources. Commanders also need to be given adequate responsibility along with these resources in order to be held accountable.

2. Greater Emphasis on Crime Mapping/Strategic Development

The JCF presently has a very limited and somewhat ineffective crime analysis capability, which severely limits the ability of field commanders to effectively understand both the nature of crime and the relationships between criminal events. Information that is given out is rarely used for a variety of reasons. The centrepiece of many departments that have turned around their crime problem is the use of accurate and timely information. This is an area in which the immediate investment of time and resources can be expected to produce short term results. This is at the core of turning around the crime problem in Jamaica. Station commanders must be given accurate information on where, when, and how crime is occurring as well as who is committing crimes. The objective, therefore, is to use this information in order to understand trends and develop proactive strategies.

3. Moving from Homicide Investigation to Homicide Analysis and Prevention

A significant number of homicides in Jamaica are reportedly the result of retaliation or domestic violence. Understanding the nature of these crimes and the patterns involved will be significant in reducing repeat crimes. -In other words, until the police begin looking at the relationships between offenders and victims (and potential victims), they will continue to be a reactive force. The police need to view their responsibility as not only responding to and investigating crime, but also and more importantly, preventing the next crime. This involves the examination of everything we know about locations, persons, and minor crimes, all of which may contribute to a pattern of more serious crime. In the case of crimes that suggest retaliation may take place, an immediate strategy must be developed to focus on likely targets of additional violence.

4. Reducing Fear of the Community and Fear of the Police / Model Station

It was evident that both citizens and police alike share a common sense of fear. For many citizens the police are to be feared, not embraced, and for many constables there is a concomitant fear of interacting with citizens even in routine matters. Because of the high levels of violence coupled with the prevalence of guns, constables often feel unsafe and vulnerable. For this reason the police have adopted para-military techniques such as carrying assault weapons, wearing bulletproof vests outside their uniforms, and travelling in groups of four.

This appearance of the police and the perception that police use considerably more force than may be necessary has resulted in citizen fears of interactions with constables. The resultant mutual mistrust has the net effect of isolating the police from the very citizens whose support is vital in order for the police to do their job effectively. While it would be unrealistic to believe this mistrust can be eliminated overnight, there needs to be a conscious effort to develop strategies that rebuild the police-citizen relationship. De-escalating the level of fear on both sides should be expected to result in fewer of the police-citizen confrontations that all too often result in a fatality.

While it is clearly evident is that the JCF understands the value of community policing, it is also clear that this term cannot be sufficiently embraced by police working in an environment where they are fearful of their own citizenry. One way to begin to reduce this fear is to create a model station, which focuses on reaching out to the community using a very different approach. Certainly the faith community could be helpful in this regard. A model station could serve as the cornerstone of an effort to rebuild the police-community relationship. Clearly rebuilding the mutual trust and respect of the community and the police is critical to any success.


5. Repositioning the Entire Criminal Justice System

The overall system of justice the police depend upon for support is broken. Cases take up to three years to adjudicate and there exists little coordination between the various components of the system. Police, prosecutors, judges, and probation officers work independently of each other. There is virtually no plea-bargaining, which results in backlogs that cause long trial delays. Without citizen support and trust there is a dramatic decrease in the ability of the police and prosecutors to secure convictions. The witness protection program is severely understaffed and underfunded. This has an enormous impact on citizens' willingness to come forward. Like the police, these other components of the system need to undergo significant change to provide the kind of support necessary to ensure both justice and a reduction of violent crime.

6. Partnership with the Faith Community and Private Sector

All the work described above must be supported by a coordinated effort to engage other stakeholders in this process. The faith community, educators, and the private sector must work along side the police department to bring together the resources needed to support a prevention strategy as well as provide alternatives to a life of crime for those Jamaicans at risk. There is a need for a leadership council that is willing to serve as the catalyst for change. For example, after school programs, prenatal assistance, summer jobs, longer school hours, and meaningful role models are as important, if not more important, as a coordinated law enforcement strategy. Taking steps to address idle youth will be equally as important as an effective crime reduction strategy by the police.

6. Appendix F - Current JCF structure



7. Appendix G - Salary comparisons

Client Sponsored Salary Survey
 Financial Service Sector
 Jamaica, 2007
 Basic Salary Summary

Table 2A

JOB TITLES	MAXIMUM	MEAN	MINIMUM
DEPUTY GENERAL MANAGER, FINANCE & ADMIN	\$7,000,000	\$5,495,222	\$3,438,182
EXECUTIVE, CORPORATE PLANNING ETC.	\$6,399,750	\$4,825,853	\$3,031,574
EXECUTIVE, COMPLIANCE & SECURITY	\$6,240,511	\$4,514,636	\$3,332,667
EXECUTIVE, GROUP HUMAN RESOURCES	\$8,348,032	\$6,128,988	\$4,600,000
SENIOR MANAGER, BUSINESS DEVELOPMENT	\$5,250,000	\$3,391,689	\$2,719,000
SENIOR MANAGER, OPERATIONS	\$4,050,000	\$3,031,868	\$1,993,153
SENIOR MANAGER, ADMINISTRATION	\$3,453,043	\$2,745,512	\$1,796,639
REGIONAL MANAGER	\$3,099,996	\$2,863,123	\$2,626,250
AUDIT MANAGER	\$4,042,137	\$3,093,131	\$1,784,615
BRANCH MANAGER	\$4,466,282	\$2,721,232	\$1,765,500
TECHNICAL SERVICE MANGER	\$4,042,137	\$2,837,261	\$2,044,169
COMPLIANCE MANAGER	\$4,042,137	\$3,019,751	\$2,200,000
COMPLIANCE OFFICER	\$2,363,888	\$1,865,443	\$983,455
Training MANAGER	\$2,985,487	\$2,189,245	\$1,605,000
USER SUPPORT MANAGER	\$3,630,532	\$2,348,880	\$1,453,314
SECURITY MANAGER	\$3,273,664	\$2,383,679	\$1,744,871
LEGAL OFFICER	\$4,259,964	\$2,599,859	\$1,876,336
PROJECT COORDINATOR	\$2,363,888	\$1,604,472	\$978,000
HUMAN RESOURCE Officer	\$3,930,750	\$2,661,730	\$1,605,000
SENIOR ACCOUNTANT	\$3,121,160	\$2,041,822	\$1,105,228
COMPUTER OPERATOR	\$1,445,424	\$984,392	\$633,137
MORTGAGE SUPERVISOR	\$1,062,254	\$1,022,854	\$983,455
PROMOTION SALES REPRESENTATIVE	\$1,235,542	\$1,097,811	\$983,455

	MAXIMUM	MEAN	MINIMUM
ACCOUNTANT	\$1,900,000	\$1,442,587	\$983,455
QUALITY ASSURANCE OFFICER	\$1,062,254	\$1,022,854	\$983,455
CUSTOMER SERVICE SUPERVISOR	\$1,868,967	\$1,392,513	\$983,455
PAYROLL SUPERVISOR	\$2,136,960	\$1,372,472	\$983,455
ADMINISTRATIVE ASSISTANT	\$1,896,552	\$1,229,942	\$740,433
EXECUTIVE ASSISTANT	\$2,363,888	\$1,471,690	\$983,455
OPERATIONS SUPERVISOR	\$1,817,529	\$1,436,755	\$983,455
AUDITOR	\$2,298,417	\$1,664,768	\$740,433
CUSTOMER SERVICE REPRESENTATIVE	\$1,407,945	\$991,339	\$572,557
BRANCH SECRETARY	\$1,663,935	\$1,104,130	\$628,978
TELEPHONE OPERATOR	\$840,236	\$667,109	\$442,924
ACCOUNTING CLERK	\$1,067,787	\$839,470	\$512,930
CUSTOMER CARE AGENT	\$1,067,787	\$836,450	\$496,025

Client Sponsored Salary Survey
Financial Service Sector
Jamaica, 2007
Total Earnings Summary

Table 2B

JOB TITLES	MAXIMUM	MEAN	MINIMUM
DEPUTY GENERAL MANAGER, FINANCE & ADMIN	\$12,658,187	\$8,473,941	\$5,540,693
EXECUTIVE CORPORATE PLANNING ETC.	\$11,356,145	\$7,709,840	\$4,360,942
EXECUTIVE COMPLIANCE & SECURITY	\$9,920,331	\$7,137,857	\$4,691,390
EXECUTIVE GROUP HUMAN RESOURCES	\$13,009,890	\$9,271,723	\$6,423,262
SENIOR MANAGER BUSINESS DEVELOPMENT	\$6,773,000	\$4,925,399	\$3,981,114
SENIOR MANAGER OPERATIONS	\$5,975,160	\$4,529,394	\$3,003,854
SENIOR MANAGER ADMINISTRATION	\$5,975,160	\$4,310,838	\$2,875,067
REGIONAL MANAGER	\$4,824,460	\$4,813,066	\$4,801,673
AUDIT MANAGER	\$5,540,693	\$4,577,592	\$3,058,837
BRANCH MANAGER	\$6,892,118	\$4,139,503	\$2,913,566
TECHNICAL SERVICE MANGER	\$5,087,512	\$4,071,280	\$3,194,500
FINANCE MANAGER	\$5,540,693	\$4,368,674	\$3,214,360
COMPLIANCE MANAGER	\$5,087,512	\$4,324,731	\$3,319,500
COMPLIANCE OFFICER	\$3,108,711	\$2,621,500	\$2,177,561
TRAINING MANAGER	\$4,562,281	\$3,398,757	\$2,582,936
USER SUPPORT MANAGER	\$5,048,265	\$3,241,016	\$2,056,410
SECURITY MANAGER	\$4,392,025	\$3,056,936	\$2,141,118
LEGAL OFFICER	\$6,584,874	\$3,895,596	\$2,693,460
PROJECT COORDINATOR	\$3,108,711	\$2,111,594	\$1,351,804
HUMAN RESOURCE OFFICER	\$4,871,309	\$3,814,891	\$2,455,260
SENIOR ACCOUNTANT	\$4,766,113	\$2,785,584	\$1,437,511
COMPUTER OPERATOR	\$1,823,685	\$1,255,078	\$898,796

	MAXIMUM	MEAN	MINIMUM
PROMOTION SALES REPRESENTATIVE	\$1,680,847	\$1,591,504	\$1,445,561
ACCOUNTANT	\$2,519,000	\$1,857,298	\$1,295,561
QUALITY ASSURANCE OFFICER	\$1,445,561	\$1,348,125	\$1,250,689
CUSTOMER SERVICE SUPERVISOR	\$2,766,503	\$1,818,888	\$1,295,561
PAYROLL SUPERVISOR	\$2,394,856	\$1,732,594	\$1,295,561
ADMINISTRATIVE ASSISTANT	\$2,158,099	\$1,530,446	\$1,160,821
EXECUTIVE ASSISTANT	\$3,108,711	\$1,898,726	\$1,295,561
IT SUPERVISOR	\$3,650,454	\$2,467,839	\$1,295,561
OPERATIONS SUPERVISOR	\$2,072,320	\$1,725,803	\$1,295,561
AUDITOR	\$3,453,055	\$2,300,130	\$1,160,821
CUSTOMER SERVICE REPRESENTATIVE	\$1,718,054	\$1,285,811	\$846,074
BRANCH SECRETARY	\$1,905,593	\$1,365,764	\$1,038,221
TELEPHONE OPERATOR	\$1,058,167	\$910,310	\$752,900
ACCOUNTING CLERK	\$1,447,010	\$1,107,179	\$910,568
CUSTOMER CARE AGENT	\$1,447,010	\$1,112,502	\$891,973

Jamaica Constabulary Force

POST/LEVEL	Minimum	Mean/Midpoint	Maximum
Commissioner	\$3,880,090	\$4,135,027	\$4,389,965
Deputy Commissioner	\$3,048,385	\$3,248,676	\$3,448,968
Assistant Commissioner	\$2,541,819	\$2,708,827	\$2,875,835
Senior Superintendent	\$2,042,361	\$2,176,553	\$2,310,745
Superintendent	\$1,687,056	\$1,797,903	\$1,908,749
Deputy Superintendent	\$1,393,563	\$1,485,126	\$1,576,688
Assistant Superintendent	\$1,119,733	\$1,193,304	\$1,266,875
Inspector	\$848,063	\$903,784	\$959,506
Sergeant	\$713,871	\$760,775	\$807,679
Corporal	\$600,912	\$640,394	\$679,877
Constable	\$505,827	\$539,062	\$572,297

Prison Warders

POST/LEVEL	Minimum	Mean/Midpoint	Maximum
SUPERINTENDENT A	1153931	1229749.005	1305567.011
SUPERINTENDENT B	999908	1065606.062	1131304.123
ASSISTANT SUPERINTENDENT	866444	923372.9288	980301.8576
OVERSEER	752089	801504.3357	850919.6714
PTSG/CO 3	607394	647302.28	687210.5601
PTSG/CO 2	501811	534782.0434	567753.0867
PTSG/CO 1	441865	470897.345	499929.69

Fire Service

POST/LEVEL	Minimum	Mean/Midpoint	Maximum
COMMISSIONER			
Deputy Commissioner	\$2,398,412	\$2,589,415	\$2,780,417
Assistant Commissioner	\$1,942,316	\$2,089,012	\$2,235,707
Superintendent	\$1,601,444	\$1,728,978	\$1,856,512
Senior Deputy Superintendent	\$1,252,554	\$1,331,158	\$1,409,761
Deputy Superintendent	\$1,109,590	\$1,179,222	\$1,248,853
Assistant Superintendent	\$981,158	\$1,042,730	\$1,104,302
Assistant Chief Officer	\$864,230	\$918,464	\$972,698
District Officer	\$785,169	\$834,442	\$883,715
Sergeant	\$702,212	\$746,279	\$790,346
Corporal	\$617,329	\$656,069	\$694,809
Lance Corporal	\$546,610	\$580,912	\$615,214
Firefighter	\$485,233	\$515,684	\$546,134
	\$430,841	\$457,878	\$484,915

Registered Nurses

Post/Level	Minimum	Mean/Midpoint	Maximum
level 10			
level 9	\$1,763,449	\$1,929,818	\$2,096,187
level 8	\$1,532,182	\$1,676,732	\$1,821,283
level 7	\$1,346,090	\$1,473,084	\$1,600,078
level 6	\$1,206,367	\$1,320,179	\$1,433,992
	\$1,109,126	\$1,213,764	\$1,318,402

level 5		\$1,081,553	\$1,183,590	\$1,285,627
level 4		\$916,674	\$1,003,156	\$1,089,638
level 3		\$816,318	\$893,332	\$970,346
level 2		\$680,375	\$744,564	\$808,752
level 1		\$581,115	\$635,939	\$690,763

Civil Servants

Position Title	Minimum	Midpoint	Maximum
Executive Management Series (EMG)			
Executive Management Series (EMG)	\$3,816,876	\$4,291,816	\$4,766,755
Chief Technical Director			
Chief Technical Director	\$3,816,876	\$4,176,971	\$4,537,066
Senior Executive Series (GMG/SEG)			
SEG 6	\$2,759,616	\$3,019,966	\$3,280,316
SEG 5	\$2,365,392	\$2,588,550	\$2,811,708
SEG 4	\$2,007,000	\$2,196,346	\$2,385,692
SEG 3	\$1,615,956	\$1,768,410	\$1,920,864
SEG 2	\$1,326,060	\$1,451,164	\$1,576,269
SEG 1	\$1,025,004	\$1,121,706	\$1,218,408
Administrative Management (AM)			
AM 4	\$912,768	\$998,881	\$1,084,994
AM 3	\$758,268	\$829,805	\$901,342
AM 2	\$610,212	\$667,781	\$725,350
AM 1	\$498,336	\$545,350	\$592,365

Project Component	Timeframe for implementation												Capital/ Training Expenditure	Technical Assistance	
exercise															
Implement secondary employment policy														N	N
Renewal of oath of office														N	N
Internal Accountability															
Develop policing plans and planning system														N	Y
Develop Divisional plans														N	Y
Implement temporary performance appraisal system														N	Y
Implement permanent performance appraisal system														N	Y
Review and revision of legislation, book of rules, regulations and Force standing orders														N	Y
Capacity building for Inspectorate General's Office														N	Y
Review of discipline system														N	Y
Implementation of revisions to discipline system														N	N
Review of outstanding breaches and action implemented														N	N
Establishment of courts of enquiry in Kingston and Regions														N	N
External Accountability															
Roll out of community policing and community safety models														Y	Y
Embedding of community safety arrangements in local structures														N	N
Merger of PSC and PCOA														N	Y
Redefinition of role and responsibilities														N	Y

Project Component	Timeframe for implementation												Capital/ Training Expenditure	Technical Assistance	
between Ministry and revised PSC														N	N
Amendment of the Public Service Regulations to reflect PSC changes														N	N
Performance contract agreed with the Commissioner of Police														N	Y
Development of PSC inspection and audit function														N	Y
Delegation of HR functions from PSC to JCF														N	N
Disbandment of PPCA and merger with ICI														N	Y
Annual reports from JCF and PSC														N	N
Leadership and management arrangements															
Definition of leadership style														N	Y
Creation of SEC and SET														N	N
Appointment of advisor														N	N
Establishment of leadership development programme														N	Y
Review of GEP and implementation of amendments														N	Y
Roll out of divisional primacy														N	Y
Expansion of communications unit														N	N
Development of communications plan														N	N
Implementation of communications plan														N	N
Implementation of Force Intranet														Y	Y
Transfer of responsibility for guarding and transport of prisoners														Y	Y
Assessment of T&R and implementation of recommendation														N	Y
Merger of Staff College and Police														Y	Y

Project Component	Timeframe for implementation												Capital/ Training Expenditure	Technical Assistance
Academy													Y	Y
Development of College into executive agency													N	Y
Implementation of civilianisation programme														
Professionalising the JCF														
Establishment of civilian HR Unit													N	N
Development of HR functions													N	Y
Delegation of HR functions to managers													N	N
Revision of recruitment criteria													N	N
Upgrading of arrangements for Security vetting of recruits													N	Y
Implementation of Conscientiousness Testing as part of vetting													Y	Y
Recruitment promotion campaign													N	N
Establishment of programme to assist non academically qualified candidates													N	N
Establishment of cadet programme													N	N
Outsourcing of recruitment process													N	N
Upgrading of Twickenam Park complex													Y	N
Revision of recruit training programme													N	Y
Reimplementation of Tutor Constable system													N	Y
Revision of overall learning strategy													N	Y
Realignment of learning strategy with new direction and upgrading of curriculum													N	Y
Training in human rights legislation													N	Y
Review and upgrading of command course structure													N	Y
Reactivation of Strategic Command													N	Y

Project Component	Timeframe for implementation												Capital/ Training Expenditure	Technical Assistance		
Course																
Monitoring of promotion system by Inspector General's Office															N	N
Establishment of career development and succession planning programmes															N	Y
Pay/rank/compensation review															N	Y
Implementation of pay/rank/compensation review															N	Y
Review and implementation of new Reward and Recognition Strategy															N	Y
Review of location of police stations and police buildings															N	Y
Implementation of review of police stations and buildings															Y	N
ICT strategy															N	Y
Review and upgrading of PNCC															N	N
Action plan to drive out benefits of IBIS and AFIS															N	Y
Implementation of protocols for security and use of e-mail															Y	Y
Upgrading of IT infrastructure															Y	Y

9. Appendix I - Full list of recommendations

1. Changing the culture of the organisation should form a central theme of the transformation.
2. Since organisational culture is often not well understood, senior officers and managers should receive training in organisational culture and its implications for leadership; this should be subsequently incorporated into leadership and management training offered at the Staff College.
3. The name of the JCF should be changed to the *Jamaica Police Service*.
4. The police uniform and symbols should be redesigned to reflect the ethos and requirements of a more modern customer oriented police service.
5. Decisions on the re-design of uniforms and other symbols should be done in consultation with JCF staff, the Police Officers Association, the Police Federation, and the public.
6. The JCF should promulgate a zero tolerance policy towards corruption.
7. The Commissioner's zero tolerance policy towards corruption should be increasingly communicated across the Force and to the general public.
8. The JCF anti-corruption policy should be fully implemented with sufficient funds provided for its implementation by GoJ.
9. The JCF should review and update its personnel security vetting policy. This should include developing a policy and implementation of arrangements for automatic polygraph testing of the senior executive team and staff in identified sensitive positions across the Force.
10. As an immediate measure to assure a corruption free environment and enable broader reforms, an extraordinary security vetting exercise should be carried out so that all staff meet the security vetting criteria set out for their positions.
11. Steps should be taken to develop a secondary employment and a conflict of interest policy; the oversight bodies discussed in Section 6 should have responsibility for monitoring these policies.
12. Each member of the JCF should renew their oath of office as a commitment to the culture and ethos of the new organisation.
13. A clear set of policing priorities over a three (3) year horizon should be developed and embedded in a three (3) year policing plan and annual policing plans that includes objectives, performance indicators and targets for the whole Force.
14. The JCF's overarching Policing Plan should be supported by corresponding Divisional Plans for each geographic Division and plans for specialist areas such as Community Policing, Crime Prevention, Crime and Intelligence and

Operations.

15. Each Divisional or specialist plan should also contain clear objectives, performance indicators and targets that reflect the overarching priorities set out in the JCF Policing Plan.
16. In due course, the priorities of Divisional and specialist plans should be cascaded and interpreted at individual level through an effective performance appraisal system.
17. Current arrangements for performance appraisal in the JCF should be reviewed, revised as necessary and the concept of performance appraisal re-launched across the Force.
18. As a minimum, the performance management system should include a performance agreement for gazetted officers where each is required to commit to key deliverables at the start of the year against which they will be assessed at the end. Reward should be linked to achievement of these deliverables.
19. In Year One of implementation, the JCF should implement a slimmed down performance appraisal system linked to a simple reward framework. This should be superseded in year two by a formal and comprehensive performance appraisal system.
20. The JCF should consult with the MNS PMAS team to learn lessons from the Ministry's PMAS implementation to guide the development of a performance appraisal system for the JCF.
21. The performance appraisal system adopted by the JCF should be linked with the three year and annual planning process for the Force as a whole.
22. The JCF should implement arrangements for a professional HR unit and this unit should take responsibility for the management of an effective performance appraisal arrangement in the Force.
23. A focus on respect for human rights should be included in all senior managers work plans under the performance management system.
24. The JCF Act, the Book of Rules (1988), the Police Services Regulation (1961), and the JCF Manual of Force Standing Orders, Volume 1 should be revised and streamlined to bring them into line with the needs of a modern policing service.
25. The inspection functions currently resident with the PCOA should operate at a more strategic level monitoring JCF performance and carrying out periodic thematic inspections of specific areas of performance.
26. The GoJ should initiate a comprehensive review of the discipline system with a view to bringing it into line with modern policing practice, providing a greater emphasis on remedial action versus punishment.

In the interim:

27. A review and analysis of all outstanding breaches by JCF staff below the rank of Inspector should be carried out and action taken as appropriate.
28. All outstanding cases of criminal breaches against Gazetted Officers should be properly prepared and sent to the PSC immediately.
29. The backlog of some 500 outstanding disciplinary cases should be processed as a matter of urgency.
30. A permanent Court of Enquiry to deal with serious disciplinary matters should be established in Kingston serving the Corporate Area and Saint Catherine.
31. Regional Courts should be established in the Western and Central ends of the Island.
32. Retired Senior Attorneys and retired Judges should be asked to serve as Presidents of Regional Courts.
33. Lawyers should be used to prosecute matters against members before the Court of Enquiry; police officers who are qualified as lawyers should also be trained to act as prosecutors in the Court of Enquiry.
34. The JCF should ensure that effective local level mechanisms are in place to incorporate the views of citizens in determining local policing priorities and strategies.
35. The Community-Based Policing Model should further be developed and rolled out involving as many communities and their organisations as possible.
36. The JCF should strategically establish institutional arrangements and partnerships with institutions such as the Social Development Commission and relevant non-governmental agencies that can assist in sustaining and monitoring the participation of communities.
37. The PSC should ensure that the participation by the police in public partnerships is regularly audited as part of PSC and JCF inspection arrangements.
38. The PCOA should be merged with the PSC to form a single oversight body.
39. There should be a periodic rotation of members in and out of the Police Services Commission to ensure its effectiveness over time.
40. That the PSC Regulations be amended to reflect PSC responsibility for appointments for Gazetted Officers only at and above the Senior Superintendent rank.
41. The PSC should assume PCOA functions for monitoring the performance of the JCF. This should include the establishment of a three (3) year strategic plan, an annual police plan and a performance framework for monitoring JCF performance.

42. An appropriate staffing model for the newly expanded PSC should be developed as soon as possible and staffed as a priority.
43. The PSC should establish a Performance Contract with the Commissioner of Police setting out objectives and targets against which the Commissioner's performance will be assessed on an annual basis. Satisfactory performance against the Contract should be linked to compensation and reward.
44. The PSC should retain an inspection/audit function. However, this should be at a strategic level and not duplicate the role and responsibilities of the Office of the Inspector General in the JCF.
45. The PSC inspection/audit function should focus on annual audits of police performance and thematic reviews of specific areas of operation, potentially in partnership with the Internal Audit team from the MNS, other areas of Government or external consultancies.
46. Once a productive working relationship has been established between the JCF and the PSC and the PSC assesses the JCF as competent, it should delegate its HR functions to the JCF, including responsibility for appointment, promotion, training and discipline.
47. The Ministry and PSC should redefine their working relationship with regard to their relative responsibilities for planning, the oversight of expenditure and for holding the JCF to account for its performance.
48. The GoJ should review the Public Service Regulations relating to the PSC and amend as required to reflect the new relationship between and the MNS in relation to police performance and accountability.
49. The PPCA should be disbanded and its functions subsumed into the proposed Independent Commission for Investigations (ICI).
50. The JCF should prepare, with the assistance of the PSC, an annual report on its performance which should be made publicly available.
51. At the same time, the PSC should prepare an annual report on its performance and that of the JCF, which it should submit to Parliament.
52. The Commissioner should clearly and publicly articulate the dominant leadership style which will be rewarded in the JCF.
53. Two key decision and problem solving structures should be created: A Senior Executive Committee and a Senior Management Team, together with a secretariat to provide coordination and support (this should be drawn from existing resource allocations within the HQ).
54. A senior advisor should be appointed to work alongside the Commissioner to support him in the implementation and development of sound internal government and management structure and arrangements.

55. A leadership training programme should be established linked to career development and succession planning for key leadership and managerial posts across the JCF.
56. Divisional Primacy should be further rolled out and embedded as a core element of JCF management arrangements; in this context, further effort is required on the part of the JCF leadership to clarify roles between Area and Divisional Commanders.
57. The JCF civilian communications team should be expanded to allow a greater focus on communication in addition to existing public relations activities. Additional staff also should be civilian.
58. Current internal communication arrangements should be rationalised and a comprehensive internal and external communications plan developed for the Force.
59. The JCF should undertake a thorough review of the mandate and functions of the Constabulary Communications Network to ensure they are aligned with future requirements of the police service and the public it serves.
60. Mechanisms to facilitate two (2) way communications between staff and senior managers should be implemented.
61. The implementation of an integrated IT system and the roll out of e-mail to all staff, units and police stations should be fast tracked to facilitate electronic communication.
62. The implementation of a Force Intranet should be fast tracked to allow management information and orders, to be distributed electronically.
63. The responsibility for guarding courts, and transporting prisoners to court and correctional institutions should be removed from the JCF and either transferred to the Correctional Services or divested to the private sector. The MNS should undertake a comprehensive study of prisoner transport to establish the most cost efficient and effective option.
64. An independent assessment should be conducted to ascertain the cost benefit of different alternative service delivery options for the fleet service and repair programs.
65. The Police Academy and Staff College should be merged into a single 'police college'.
66. Once initial effort in support the transformation of the JCF as set out in this plan has been expended, the police college should be transformed into an Executive Agency.
67. The civilianization programme should be revised and re-introduced to the JCF

- as a key instrument of renewal and professionalization. To facilitate this, a civilian position of Director, Corporate Services should be established.
68. The JCF should identify all posts suitable for civilianisation and immediately initiate a programme of civilianisation. This should include as a minimum the areas that have been previously identified in JCF Reviews as suitable for civilianisation: JCF Personnel Management; HQ stores; and support staff in all general offices and residual staff in the Police National Computer Centre.
 69. The proposed change oversight body (PROC) together with the new PSC should monitor the implementation of this programme.
 70. The MNS should engage with the Ministry of Finance and the Public Service to resolve any outstanding issues impeding the establishment of a Civilian HR Unit.
 71. The JCF should staff and make functional its civilian HR function as a matter of priority.
 72. The JCF should ensure that its HR function is staffed with an appropriate blend of professional civilian staff and that only qualified sworn police officers be deployed into the function on an as needed basis and if they are suitably qualified.
 73. By Year Three (3) of Implementation, JCF managers should be equipped to receive delegated responsibility, on a day to day basis, for some HR functions.
 74. The JCF should implement a policy that requires all recruits accepted onto its training programme to (a) meet the basic requirements and (b) pass security screening.
 75. Height, weight and age restrictions on recruitment should be eliminated and replaced by an appropriate and bonafide physical ability test.
 76. Arrangements for the security vetting of recruits should be reviewed and upgraded in line with the upgrading of security vetting across the organisation.
 77. There should be an increased emphasis placed on the integrity, values and conscientiousness of potential recruits. To this end, the JCF should explore the employment of a reliable and valid Conscientiousness Testing instrument.
 78. The MNS should engage the JCF and civil society (including academia and the business community) in a concerted long-term initiative to promote the JCF as a viable career alternative for bright and capable Jamaicans.
 79. The JCF, in partnership with local academic institution(s), should develop an academic upgrading program to assist non-academically qualified but otherwise suitable candidates, to achieve the required academic credentials to allow them to enter the JCF.

80. The Graduate Entry Programme should be re-vitalised and expanded as a means of attracting university graduates into the ranks of the Service.
81. The Cadet Program should be re-instituted with such modifications to ensure it meets the modern requirements of the Force.
82. The JCF should conduct a full feasibility study to determine which specific elements of the recruiting process can be outsourced, and implement outsourcing at the earliest opportunity.
83. The GoJ should make a significant capital investment in the Twickenham Park training facility to ensure it provides a safe and contemporary learning environment for recruits.
84. Immediate steps should be taken to revamp the entire Recruit Training programme and align it with organisational strategy and the principles of a modern, community-oriented police service.
85. The JCF should engage civilian professionals to deliver some aspects of the programme within an appropriate mix of civilians and qualified police personnel.
86. Recruits should be provided with in-depth training on a graduated use of force continuum and human rights.
87. The Tutor Constable System should be re-implemented, aligned with the modern policing needs of the JCF with a particular emphasis on values and behaviours.
88. The existing JCF Learning Strategy 2005-2008 should be reviewed and updated to ensure it aligns with the needs and interests of a contemporary police organisation.
89. An Academic Board consisting of academics and practitioners with the appropriate credentials in adult learning, and other pertinent areas of specialization, should be established to oversee the realignment of the strategy and upgrading of the curriculum.
90. All staff should be provided training to enhance awareness of human rights legislation and the implications thereof for policing in Jamaica.
91. The Junior, Command and Strategic Command course curricula should be reviewed and revised to include a focus on elements essential to contemporary police management such as: project management, financial management, performance management, contemporary leadership skills with an emphasis on a people oriented approach to achieving results.
92. The Strategic Command course should be reactivated, integrated into a leadership development programme and linked to succession management.

93. As a priority, the JCF must enforce its existing promotion system so that its implementation is transparent and merit based.
94. The JCF's new civilian HR Unit should be given the responsibility for the administration of the promotion system including preparation of cases for the PSC.
95. The promotion system should be linked to an effective competence based performance appraisal system.
96. No staff should be considered for promotion while they have an outstanding disciplinary case pending.
97. The JCF promotion system should receive special attention from both the Inspector General and the MNS's Internal Audit team until such time as it is considered to be fair and robust.
98. The JCF should design and implement a process for managing the career development of all staff linked to training and development needs.
99. The JCF should implement a succession planning process for key positions across the organisation.
100. The Government should carry out a comprehensive rank and compensation review to establish an appropriate framework for future compensation in the JCF; as part of this review, serious consideration should be given to the streamlining of leave and other benefits (financial and non financial) as a means of balancing the overall JCF compensation package.
101. The JCF should review current arrangements for reward and recognition and develop a new reward and recognition programme linked directly performance and the introduction of a new performance appraisal system. This programme should address financial and non financial incentives.
102. The GoJ should make provision for significant capital investment into the JCF estate to bring it to a standard where it can meet the needs of a modern police service including meeting the needs of staff as well as communities.
103. Prior to making this capital investment, the MNS and the JCF should review the current location of police stations and identify any that are not appropriate located or where policing services could be delivered more effectively by alternative means. The findings from the review should be integrated into the overall programme to repair and upgrade the JCF estate.
104. The JCF should compile an ICT strategic plan to provide a blueprint for the future acquisition and integration of technologies. This should be coordinated with the overall ICT strategy currently being completed by the MNS for its entire portfolio.


105. The MNS and the JCF should review and redefine their respective role and responsibilities with regard to implementation of new technologies. The result of this redefinition should be embedded within an ICT strategy and PNCC working practices.
106. The Commissioner of Police should ensure that adequate resources (financial and human) are allocated to work alongside the MNS from the outset of each ICT project, to ensure the smooth integration of new technologies into JCF standard operating procedures.
107. The Commissioner of Police should immediately engage with the MNS to develop a plan for the integration of IBIS and AFIS systems (and other systems as required) into JCF working practices and dedicate adequate resources (human and financial) to ensuring that the benefits of these systems are realised as intended across the Force. Assistance should be sought from the MNS to engage technical assistance as appropriate.
108. The size, structure and responsibilities of the PNCC should be reviewed and the unit provided with adequate staff and support to enable it to meet the current and future ICT demands of the JCF. As part of this process, the civilianization of the PNCC should be completed and police staff currently working there, redeployed elsewhere on core policing duties.
109. The use of personal e-mail accounts for the conduct of JCF business should be prohibited and all JCF staff who have need of e-mail access provided with a secure, JCF or MNS e-mail address.
110. The JCF should undertake a training needs analysis to establish current IT training needs and design and deliver a training programme to meet these needs; this should include protocols on access and use of the Internet which should be communicated to all staff and monitored through the Office of the Inspector General.
111. IT competence among JCF staff should be monitored on a regular basis through the proposed new performance appraisal system.
112. The GoJ should adopt an approach to implementation that combines initial incisive action with a longer term managed change programme. This will provide the best opportunity to signal the transformation while ensuring that the changes are manageable and there is sufficient focus on sustainability.
113. A dedicated JCF senior staff member should be appointed as Implementation Manager by the Commissioner of Police to lead the transformation on a day to day basis. He or she should report directly to the Commissioner of Police.
114. The Implementation Manager should be supported by a 'Programme Advisor', whose role would be to mentor and assist the JCF Implementation Manager to manage the programme successfully; he or she should ideally have experience

of implementing transformational change in a police or security setting.

115. An Internal Transformation Team should be established by the JCF to support implementation of the recommendations made in this report. The Team must work closely with others, including the PSC and the MNS, in all aspects of reform.
116. The Implementation Manager should identify relevant stakeholders affected by the changes proposed, and ensure a mechanism is established for regular consultation and communication with them during implementation.
117. A Policing Reform Commission should be established for a period of five years to monitor, guide and oversee the implementation of reforms set out in this report.
118. In its communications, the GoJ should make clear its expectations that all parties will cooperate with the PRC in completing the reform programme.
119. The PRC should issue a public progress report quarterly through Years One (1) and Two (2), and then half yearly thereafter.
120. The JCF should develop a comprehensive communications plan to guide implementation and that focuses on both internal and external communication needs.
121. A communications expert with experience in change-related communications should be engaged to support the development and early implementation of this communications plan.
122. Strong consideration should be given to holding an official and public re-launching of the Jamaica Police Service at a date to be determined by the Minister of National Security, in consultation with the Commissioner of Police, the PSC and Policing Reform Commissioner.
123. A combination of Police Advisors and technical assistance should be made available to support the JCF in implementation of the recommendations made in this report.
124. Technical assistance should be provided to support the merger of the PCOA with the PSC, and strengthening of the PSC's additional planning, monitoring and oversight responsibilities.

10. Appendix J – Proposed organisation structure

The proposed structure outlined below is intended to provide guidance on the thinking of the JCF in respect of the critical functions that the new JCF will need to perform in its new dispensation. It highlights opportunities for creating a dynamic blend between police and civilian functions in carrying out the mandate of the new police service. Essentially, the Panel envisages and favours a flatter, leaner, less hierarchical structure that embraces the values and functions of a modern police organisation. In such an organisation, the top layer of management should be highly strategic and responsibility for operational matters devolved to the levels closest to the citizen. The proposed model below outlines a framework for considering how these new functions and objectives might be achieved and some permutations for improving efficiencies. We endorse the efforts of the current Commissioner to reduce duplications and overlaps across the structure. As such, the structure proposed below does not go into detail regarding the placement of units, rank distribution and other such details as we believe these can be ably worked out by the leadership. It instead seeks to open the dialogue about how best to organize the service to deliver quality policing services to the people of Jamaica.



The Commissioner’s Office

The organizational chart highlights the critical functions that are deemed relevant to the Commissioner's Office. It assumes the priority of a strong, well-resourced and efficient secretariat function that is able to meet the technical and administrative needs of the Commissioner. It also assumes a robust and dynamic communication function that manages the corporate image and key messages of the new police service. The structure proposes that the Office the Commissioner should become the primary hub for strategic planning and performance management that aligns the government's strategic objectives for peace and security with its own strategic priorities and can cascade these down into performance benchmarks for managers and staff. These processes should be supported by a strong and robust inspectorate and audit function to ensure accountability and adherence to professional standards in managing and discharging effective police services. The Panel believes that the efforts at improving integrity in the Force are going well and that a strong, just and forthright internal affairs function should be overseen by the Commissioner to maintain a corrupt free and trustworthy police service.

Corporate Services

The JCF currently has a range of corporate services that are located at various points of the organisation. Some of these include personnel, research, legal services, finance and Information and communication technologies to name just a few. These are all key activities which are very central to the success of the organisation's functioning and operations and as such they need to be managed properly. The Panel believes that a Corporate Service function should be established at a very high level to streamline these various activities and to provide a point at which the Commissioner can hold a senior officer accountable and be advised regularly on the status of these services.

Crime Management and Territorial Policing

The Panel recognizes the challenges associated with preventing and managing crime in Jamaica. Crime continues to escalate at intolerable levels and as such the functions of Crime and Operations is central to the work of the police service. Consequently, the function must be established at a fairly high level in the organization. The Panel however recognizes the need for greater levels of intelligence analysis, crime analysis and operational strategies at all levels in order to get on top of situation. As such, the Panel believes that the direct responsibility for territorial policing now assumed by the Operations function with all its attendant administrative responsibilities, takes away from the level and quality of focus that should be given to understanding the crime infrastructure in Jamaica and therefore moving from a more reactive orientation to a more proactive one. The Panel therefore, suggests that the responsibility for operational policing be removed from that for territorial policing and merged with Crime to form a Crime and Operations function. This will create an opportunity to provide a more focused approach to managing territorial policing. A new territorial policing function would ensure that:

- management and performance standards are monitored at Area and Divisional levels;
- operational policies, procedures and strategies developed by the senior management team are devolved and implemented;
- community-policing, ethics and values are integrated into regular territorial

policing;

- the span of control shared between the new Crime and Operations function and territorial policing is manageable;
- the Commissioner is able to operate at a strategic level and focus on strategy and policy because of the clear lines of responsibilities below him.